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1 Introduction
An agent in possession of an electronic ﬁle may produce a perfect copy and transfer this copy
to another agent. This is not a standard notion of production in economics. We propose
and study a resource allocation problem where agents exchange replicable objects, and time
is of the essence. We consider two forms of incentive compatibilityagents always 1) report
their true preference, and 2) fully bring to the table the resources they have. Additionally,
we propose a fairness criterion based on the concept of reciprocity. That is, we reward an
agent for contributing to others' welfare in a reciprocal manner; however, the way in which
he contributes is determined endogenously by the rule. When objects are not replicable,
Gale's Top Trading Cycles rule satisﬁes several important criteria. We extend this positive
ﬁnding by showing that in our new environment there is a family of rules satisfying all of
the aforementioned properties.
Our example is motivated by the following statistic:
Motor vehicle travel is the primary means of transportation in the United States, provid-
ing an unprecedented degree of mobility. Yet for all its advantages, motor vehicle crashes are
the leading cause of death for age 4 and every age 11 through 27 (based on 2009 data). The
mission of the National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration is to reduce deaths, injuries,
and economic losses from motor vehicle crashes.
-National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration1
The Vehicle Safety Communications-Applications program, run by the U.S. Department
of Transportation's National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration and supported by a
consortium of major car manufacturers, has developed and tested a system whereby each
vehicle broadcasts basic information (e.g. position, speed, acceleration, etc.) to surrounding
vehicles (Ahmed-Zaid et al., 2011). Such information is used as a crash counter-measure,
alerting drivers to engage in some sort of safety action. For example, a driver begins a
∗Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki. E-mail: william.phan@helsinki.ﬁ.
1Traﬃc Safety Facts, NHTSA (April 2014). DOT HS 812 016.
1
maneuver to pass a slower vehicle in front, a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction
broadcasts its presence, and the driver's dashboard ﬂashes a warning preventing a possible
collision. One disadvantage, however, is that each vehicle must listen to all broadcasts; so
messages are kept short to prevent congestion.2
We consider the case of a second layer of information exchange where vehicles may re-
quest and send longer messages (e.g. path history, path prediction) in a targeted fashion
as opposed to indiscriminate broadcasts.3 Targeted messages are not a technical constraint,
but a conscious choice to prevent congestion.4 For example, upon learning from the primary
broadcast layer that Vehicle B is approaching from the other direction, Vehicle A can request
more detailed information (e.g. Vehicle B diagnostics, path projection, path history (pot-
holes, patches of ice, debris), radar/sensor-gathered information). In this sense, Vehicle A's
request in the second layer is some function of his planned route and the information gleaned
in the primary broadcast layer. A central computer (possibly a road-side unit) collects the
requests, and recommends a process of exchange between agents. Our paper studies such
recommendations from an economic perspective.5
Scarcity arises from the tension between two properties of real-time information: the
ability to be replicated versus decaying value. Information is sent via an electronic message
in a wireless network (much like routers and laptops); capacity constraints of wireless com-
munication limit the rate of information sent. By virtue of the replicability of electronic
data, though, a message from Vehicle A can conceivably be communicated from A to B,
then B to C. If time were not an issue, then each vehicle may obtain the information it
requests. On the other hand, notice that the value of these messages decays quickly: vehicle
characteristics at any given point are irrelevant as time passes, and the group of adjacent
vehicles also changes rapidly. So there simply may not be enough time to fulﬁll each vehicle's
request before the information becomes valueless.
If a vehicle cannot get one message, then perhaps it requests another; however, each
vehicle is not indiﬀerent between all the messages generated in its vicinity. For example,
Vehicle A may wish to acquire the information of Vehicle B (which is closer to A), but
2From Routing in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: A Survey: Flooding performs relatively well for a
limited small number of nodes and is easy to be implemented. But when the number of nodes in the network
increases, the performance drops quickly. The bandwidth requested for one broadcast message transmission
can increase exponentially. As each node receives and broadcasts the message almost at the same time, this
causes contentions and collisions, broadcast storms and high bandwidth consumption (Li & Wang, 2007).
3U.S. DOT NHTSA Vehicle Safety Communications-Applications Final Report discusses layers of in-
formation exchange in Section 6.3.1 entitled Multi-Channel Operation: Under this scheme, BSMs (Basic
Safety Messages) and other important messages, including service advertisements, are exchanged on the CCH
(Control Channel) (Channel 178) during the CCH interval. During the SCH (Service Channel) interval, a
vehicle may tune its DSRC radio away from the CCH to any of the SCHs to, for example, access a service of
interest (Ahmed-Zaid et al., 2011). In Section 6.2 entitled Message Composition, the report diﬀerentiates
between critical information that is regularly broadcast, and other information that may be sent upon re-
quest of an application. Also see the SAE Dedicated Short Range Communications Implementation Guide,
page. 31.
4Sending targeted messages show signiﬁcant improvement of bandwidth utilization with slightly loss of
reachability, because the new protocols pick fewer vehicles to re-broadcast the message (Li & Wang, 2007).
5Alternatively, the computer can attempt to calculate crash probabilities and determine who should
get what information. Since each agent only submits a request, though, it may be diﬃcult to accurately
ascertain such probabilities.
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prefers this to acquiring the information of Vehicle C (which is farther away). Then, we
may say that Vehicle A has a preference relation over the set of all messages which he may
obtain.6
How shall we coordinate the transfer of information amongst vehicles? One possible solu-
tion is to design a resource allocation rule (the recommendation) specifying for each possible
situation how agents transfer amongst themselveswe take this approach. We recognize
that the actual implementation of the program is a complex combination of technical and
institutional eﬀort, but we believe our study sheds light on some economic aspects of the
problem.
The Department of Transportation is not the only organization to use information gen-
erated by vehicles. Similar safety projects involving government organizations and major
car manufacturers have been undertaken in Europe. The European Commission recently
contributed over 50 million Euros to three projects involving vehicle communications.7 Ef-
forts in the private sector (see Waze, Google's recent billion dollar acquisition) to provide
real-time traﬃc data also depend on users contributing real-time information generated from
their commute.
More generally, consider the exchange of electronic ﬁles between agents in changing envi-
ronments. For example, a set of ﬁnancial institutions exchange real-time ﬁnancial informa-
tion, or, mobile phones in short-lived ad-hoc networks share information to relieve server
load. Each of these applications exhibit the basic properties of the our model. Files that
are partially transferred may be corrupt or useless; hence, they are indivisible goods and
we refer to them as objects. Objects may be perfectly replicated and transferred from each
agent to another. For simplicity, we assume each object is of the same size, and each agent
is constrained by the same maximum transfer speed; hence, after a normalization, each ob-
ject requires one unit of time to transfer from one agent to another. Object transfer may
then be represented by rounds during which an agent may simultaneously send one object
and receive one object.8 During each round, each agent may transfer objects he received in
previous rounds. A ﬁnite number of rounds is assumed, after which each agent consumes
the most preferable object (call this his assignment) of those he has accumulated.9 A ﬁnite
number of rounds reﬂects the fact that over time, the value of the objects decreases to zero.
We study the simple case where each agent's consumption space is the set of all singleton
objects. Due to the limited number of rounds, not every agent may receive his most preferred
object.
The timing is as follows: 1) a group of agents ﬁnd themselves at the same physical
location, 2) each agent reports his preference to a central computer, 3) according to this
report, the computer uses a rule to specify a transfer process and sends this recommendation
to the agents, 4) the agents execute this transfer process to arrive at a list of assignments,
5) each agent consumes his assignment, and 6) agents disperse, and a new set of agents
6In Section 6.1, we consider the case where agents' consumption space is the set of all bundles of messages.
7See European Commission Press Release - IP/10/353 24/03/2010. Project websites: www.safespot-
eu.org, www.coopers-ip.eu, and www.cvisproject.org.
8These capacity constraints are reasonable when there are two separate channels: one for sending, and
one for receiving.
9For a survey of recently proposed routing protocols from an engineering perspective, see Li & Wang
(2007).
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convene.10 Each agent has preferences over the set of all objects, and it is possible for an
agent to withhold his object. The number of rounds and the objects contributed determine
the possible transfer processes, and hence the set of feasible allocations. Since each agent
reports his preference and endowment once before the start, we may approach the scenario
as a static resource allocation problem.11 We look for rules which specify recommendations
for each possible problem.
We focus on several desirable properties of rules and seek to understand their implications.
Eﬃciency says that no resources are wasted. Strategy-proofness says that agents do not
beneﬁt from reporting false preferences. If agents incur some unmodelled cost, then to
encourage agents to contribute to the system, withholding-proofness requires that each agent
is always at least as well oﬀ when he contributes all the resources he has (in this case,
objects). Next, we propose a fairness axiom based on the concept of reciprocity between
agents. Roughly, if j is assigned i's object, then what i is assigned must be at least as good
for him as j's object. The reciprocity lower bound requires this for every pair of agents. We
identify a family of rules satisfying these four properties, and also show that each rule in the
family is also immune to preference manipulation by groups (Theorem 1). If we strengthen
withholding-proofness to its group analog, then we arrive at impossibility (Theorem 2).
We consider two natural extensions of the model. In the ﬁrst, each agent owns and
consumes bundles of objects. In the second, agents live in a network, and may only transfer
to agents to which they are connected. Unfortunately, the positive results of the simple model
do not hold. The four properties considered in Theorem 1 are not compatible when agents
are endowed with and consume bundles (Theorem 3). When agents live in a network, we
show that eﬃciency is compatible with strategy-proofness, but not with either withholding-
proofness or the reciprocity lower bound (Theorem 4).
1.1 Related Literature
In a model without replicability, when each agent owns a diﬀerent object, consumes only
one object, and has a strict preference relation over the objects, a unique core allocation
exists; Gale's Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm identiﬁes this allocation (Shapley &
Scarf, 1974). It turns out that the only eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and individually rational
rule is the one obtained by running TTC for each economy (Ma, 1994; Anno, 2015). In the
more general case where each agent may or may not own an object, and, in addition there are
some publicly owned objects, a modiﬁcation of TTC identiﬁes an eﬃcient, strategy-proof,
and individually rational rule (Abdulkadiroglu & So¨nmez, 1999; So¨nmez & U¨nver, 2010).
Furthermore, in the same environment, the full class of group strategy-proof and eﬃcient
rules have been characterized (Pycia & U¨nver, 2015).
Replicable objects are neither fully private nor fully public goods, so we cannot apply
10The size of 1) the agent's report to the central computer (a simply ranking over objects), and 2) the
computer's recommendation message are assumed to be small compared to the size of messages that contain
safety information. Indeed, this ﬁts with the proposal that the secondary layer of information exchange
contains longer messages. The additional time needed to coordinate messages may be seen as the price of
coordination.
11We imagine a scenario in which every second (or less), the resource allocation rule coordinates for the
set of present agents.
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previously established techniques. The consumption of an object by one agent does not 1)
preclude other agents from consuming the same object, or 2) imply all other agents must
consume the object. However, the limited number of rounds available to transfer does impose
an upper bound on the number of agents who may be assigned an object. Hence, there is
a sense in which an object in our environment lies in between a private and public good.
Furthermore, our model also diﬀers from the case of production: replication and transfer
requires time and the object as inputs, but agents do not consume time, and an agent
replicating and transferring the object also keeps a copy of the object for himself (contrary
to the standard deﬁnition of an input). Although our environment is new, the algorithm
identifying our family of rules uses TTC as a key component.
The property of withholding-proofness is a central incentive compatibility requirement
in applications where agents may replicate objects (Adar & Huberman, 2000; Feldman &
Chuang, 2005). Previous studies of standard economic environments show that the property
is demanding. In the classic exchange economy with divisible goods, eﬃciency, individual ra-
tionality, and withholding-proofness are incompatible (Postlewaite, 1979). In economies with
one divisible private good and one fully public good, the Lindahl rule is not withholding-proof
(Thomson, 1979; 2010). When each agent owns diﬀerent objects, and consume bundles of
objects, 1) eﬃciency and withholding-proofness are incompatible and 2) eﬃciency, individ-
ual rationality, and strategy-proofness are incompatible (Atlamaz & Klaus, 2007; So¨nmez,
1999). We extend the analysis of withholding-proofness to an environment with replicable
objects, and show, surprisingly, that it is compatible with several desirable criteria. The
crucial diﬀerence is that private objects are rival, while objects in our environment exhibit
some nonrivalry.
2 Model
Let O be the non-empty ﬁnite set of objects (electronic messages with a particular vehicle's
real-time characteristics) with generic elements a, b, c, . . . ; O includes the null object ∅. Let
N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents (vehicles). The consumption space of each agent is O.
Each i ∈ N initially owns one object Ωi ∈ O\∅, where for each j ∈ N\{i}, Ωi 6= Ωj.12
Additionally, each i ∈ N may either 1) report that he owns Ωi, or 2) withhold his resource
by reporting that he has nothing, Ω′i = ∅. Let ON be the set of all possible proﬁles of
reported endowments.
Let R be the set of strict preference relations13 over O, and R = {Ri}i∈N ∈ RN denote
a proﬁle of preferences. For each Ri ∈ R, let Pi be the strict part of Ri.
A technology is available for T = 2 rounds for agents to replicate and transfer objects to
each other. 14 A transfer process t speciﬁes for each round, and each agent 1) what object
12The results do not change if we allow agents to initially own nothing.
13Complete, transitive, anti-symmetric orders.
14After, say, 5 seconds an electronic message with a vehicle's real-time characteristics becomes useless
(uniformly for everyone); hence, the fact that T is small is consistent with our motivating application.
Also, the problem of ﬁnding the smallest T such that for each economy, each agent may receive each object
he desires is closely related to the Gossip Problem considered in discrete mathematics (Baker & Shostak,
1971).
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he transfers, and 2) to whom he transfers. Each transfer process t satisﬁes the following
conditions:
T1 In the ﬁrst round, each agent may replicate one object in his endowment, and transfer
this copy of the object to another agent.
T2 In each subsequent round, each agent may replicate either one object in his endowment,
or one of the objects he received in a previous round, and transfer this copy of the
object to another agent.
T3 In each round, each agent may transfer and receive only one object. This implies an
agent may receive up to T objects.
Consumption occurs after all transfers are complete. We study the T = 2 case as it is the
simplest case where replicability is possible; however, we also note instances where results
do not rely on this assumption. 15
The set of agents and the number of available rounds are ﬁxed. An economy E consists
of a preference proﬁle R ∈ RN and an endowment proﬁle Ω ∈ ON ; note that we include the
possibility that some agents withhold their respective objects. Let E = RN ×ON be the set
of all economies.
For each transfer process t, a pre-allocation y(t) is a list specifying for each i the set of
objects in O he has accumulated when applying the process t. Furthermore, let Ωˆi 6= ∅ be i's
initially owned object; then, whether or not he reports Ωi = ∅, Ωˆi ∈ yi(t). The interpretation
is that even if he does not contribute it, i always keeps a copy of his own object. 16 An
allocation z is a list specifying for each agent i an object in O. An allocation z is feasible
for E if there exists a transfer process t such that for each i ∈ N , zi ∈ yi(t). For each E ∈ E ,
let Z(E) be the set of feasible allocations for E.
A rule ϕ : E → ⋃E∈E Z(E) assigns each economy a feasible allocation for that economy.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 Round 1 Round 2
c a a a a ∅ 1 a−→ 2 1 a−→ 3
b d c d b f 2
b−→ 5 2 a−→ 4
d ∅ ∅ ∅ e ... 5 b−→ 6
e b
...
...
... 3
c−→ 1 4 d−→ 1
a
...
∅
...
15Clearly there are more general ways to model transfer processes. For example, we may allow each
agent to simultaneously transfer to other agents, have a capacity constraint on the total outﬂow rate,
have a capacity constraint on the total inﬂow rate, transfer pieces instead of objects, and so forth. Our
assumptions on the transfer process can roughly be seen as the special case when object size and capacity
constraints are uniform across agents, and there is a total of T = 2r time (where r is the minimum time it
takes to transfer one object).
16In a pre-allocation y(t), an agent possesses up to T + 1 objects (including his own); however, each agent
only consumes his most preferred object in his pre-allocation bundle. In Section 6, we also consider the case
where each agent consumes each object in his pre-allocation.
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Figure 1: An economy, a transfer process, and feasible allocations. An economy E = (R,Ω) ∈ E
is represented on the left. The column R1 reads c P1b P1 dP1 e P1 aP1 ∅ with each other object
ranked below, and the box symbol a indicates Ω1 = a. The same holds for each other column Ri.
For brevity, when representing Ri, we may truncate i's preference relation after Ωi as in the column
for R2, R5, and R6. On the right, a transfer process is summarized. The column R1 indicates
transfers occuring in the ﬁrst round, and similarly for R2. The symbol 1
a−→ 2 reads 1 replicates
and transfers object a to 2. Conditions T1-T3 are satisﬁed. The transfer process results in pre-
allocation (acd, ba, ca, da, eb, fb), and e.g. implies the allocations (c, a, a, a, b, b) and (d, b, a, a, b, ∅)
are feasible.
A formal treatment of the feasible set is provided in Supplementary Appendix.
3 Axioms
In this section, we list desirable properties of rules.
The ﬁrst says that there is no alternative that would make some agents better of without
making others worse oﬀ. An allocation z is Pareto eﬃcient for E = (R,Ω) ∈ E if there is
no z′ ∈ Z(E) s.t.
1. for each i ∈ N , z′iRi zi, and
2. for at least one i ∈ N , z′i Pi zi.
Eﬃciency: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , ϕ(E) is Pareto eﬃcient for E.
Next, we introduce incentive compatibility constraints.
The key property in designing resource allocation rules is the prevention of manipulation
by unilateral misreporting of preferences.17 A stronger property of non-manipulation of the
rule by group misrepresentation of preferences follows. These conditions ensure the designer
elicits the true preference proﬁle; without this property, eﬃciency and other fairness criteria
are evaluated from the standpoint of a false preference proﬁle.
Strategy-proofness: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , each i ∈ N , and each R′i ∈ R,
ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(R
′
i, R−i,Ω).
Group strategy-proofness: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , there is no S ⊆ N , and R′S ∈ RS
such that for each i ∈ S,
ϕi(R
′
S, R−S,Ω)Ri ϕi(E),
and for some j ∈ S,
17Notice that an agent misreports by lying about his preference, not about the information he transfers
(e.g. location, speed, etc.).
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ϕj(R
′
S, R−S,Ω)Pj ϕj(E).
The next axiom simultaneously addresses the manipulability of a rule and the incentiviza-
tion for agents to fully contribute their resources. It requires that each agent may never be
better oﬀ by withholding some of his endowment. In our application, withholding means
an agent may somehow turn oﬀ the machine that allows him to send information, while
keeping on the machine that allows him to receive. We also mention its role in combating
free-riding below. When an agent only owns one object and withholds, then we simply write
that his endowment is ∅. A stronger version involving manipulation of the rule by groups
follows.
Withholding-proofness: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , each i ∈ N , and each Ω′i ⊆ Ωi
ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(R,Ω
′
i,Ω−i).
Group withholding-proofness: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , there is no S ⊆ N and
Ω′S ∈ RS s.t. for each i ∈ S, Ω′i ⊆ Ωi,
ϕi(R,Ω
′
S,Ω−S)Ri ϕi(R,Ω),
and for some j ∈ S,
ϕj(R,Ω
′
S,Ω−S)Pj ϕj(E).
Let non-manipulability be the property which states that each agent is always at least
as well oﬀ when telling the truth than when he jointly 1) lies about his preference, and 2)
withholds some resources. The conjunction of withholding-proofness and strategy-proofness
imply non-manipulability : For each E ∈ E , each i ∈ N , each R′i ∈ R, and each Ω′i ⊆ Ωi,
ϕi(R,Ω)Ri ϕ(R,Ω
′
i,Ω−i)Ri ϕi(R
′
i, R−i,Ω
′
i,Ω−i).
Participation constraints are standard in the design of rules: no agent should be worse
oﬀ than how he started. For each Ω ∈ ON , let Ωˆ be the true endowment proﬁleno agent
withholds his object.
Individual Rationality For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , and each i ∈ N , ϕi(E)Ri Ωˆi.
For each E ∈ E , and each z ∈ Z(E), notice that if z does not satisfy individual rationality
for S ⊆ N at E, there is z′ = (z′S = ΩS, z−i) ∈ Z(E) that Pareto-dominates z and satisﬁes
the property at E. This follows from the fact that each agent keeps a copy of his own
object. Hence, one interesting feature of our environment not present in the standard object
re-allocation problem is that eﬃciency implies individual rationality.
Next, we wish to require some sort of fairness. The ﬁrst property is well-known: no agent
prefers another agent's assignment to his own.
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No-envy For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , and each i, j ∈ N , ϕi(E)Ri ϕj(E).
Eﬃciency and no-envy are incompatible, as is the case in many environments with dis-
crete resources and deterministic rules. For example, in the economy E in Figure 2 below,
each rule satisfying eﬃciency assigns a to 3 agents (this is the maximum number of agents
that can receive a) in the set {2, 3, 4, 5}, leaving one agent in the set envying the others. The
same issue occurs if we deﬁne a weaker property based on treating agents equally if they
have the same preference. Hence, we look for alternative fairness criteria.
One issue with no-envy (and the weaker equal treatment property) is that the agents'
contributions are not taken into account. What if Ωi is assigned to several agents, whereas
Ωj is not desired by anyone? Would one ﬁnd compelling a system where others received your
information, but you could not get theirs? It seems intuitive and minimally fair to recognize
this asymmetry.
Furthermore, in real-life peer-to-peer systems of electronic resource exchange, free-
riding is cited as a frequent and prevalent frustrationin one popular systems, 70% of users
did not contribute (Adar & Huberman, 2000). A growing literature (featuring contributions
by both economists and computer scientists) demonstrates that incentive compatibility con-
siderations and reciprocal arrangements help to combat this problem (Feldman & Chuang,
2005). Here, withholding-proofness and the following property formally play these roles.
Motivated by the points above, we propose a fairness axiom that embodies the concept
of reciprocity between agents: if you help me, then I should help you (if you wish). More
formally, if agent j is assigned an object a which originally belonged to i, then what i is
assigned should be at least as good as j's endowment. The axiom requires that this condition
hold for each pair of agents.
Reciprocity lower bound: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , there is no i, j ∈ N such that
ϕj(E) = Ωi, and Ωj Pi ϕi(E).
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
c a a a a b a a a a b b b
b b c d e a b
a
Figure 2: Let E ∈ E be as on the left above. If z = (b, a, a, a, e), then notice that z3 = a = Ω1,
and Ω3 = c P1 b = z1; so z violates the reciprocity lower bound (but satisﬁes no-envy). If 2 is
assigned a, then the property requires that 1 is assigned b or c. If 3 is assigned a, then the property
requires that 1 is assigned c. If z = (c, a, a, a, e), then z violates no-envy but satisﬁes the reciprocity
lower bound . The proﬁle on the right pertains to the discussion of the core.
We formally discuss its relation to other concepts.
It has zero eﬃciency content: A rule that assigns (∅, . . . , ∅) for each economy satisﬁes
the reciprocity lower bound. Also, no-envy and the reciprocity lower bound are logically
independent as the examples in Figure 2 show. In contrast to no-envy though, eﬃciency
and the reciprocity lower bound are compatible.
Although the property is reminiscent of the core constraints, notice that it does not
establish the right of an agent to select whom to trade with. For example, in Figure 2
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in the right economy, z = (a, a, a, a, b, b, b, b) is an allocation that may be recommended
by a rule satisfying eﬃciency and the reciprocity lower bound ; however, if 1 and 5 had a
choice, they would choose to trade with each other. This clearly violates core considerations.
Furthermore, as we see below, allocations recommended by a rule satisfying the reciprocity
lower bound may fall outside of an even weaker version of the core.
Formally, an allocation z ∈ Z(E) is in the core of E if there is no S ⊆ N and (z′S, z−S) ∈
Z(E) such that for each i ∈ S, z′i ∈ ΩS, z′iRi zi, and for some j ∈ S, z′j Pj zj. First, the core
constraints contain statements for all possible groups of agents, while the reciprocity lower
bound is simply pairwise. Second, the core may be empty: Let E ∈ E be as in Figure 2,
except 1 top-ranks his own object. There are four eﬃcient allocations z1 = (a, a, a, a, e), z2 =
(a, a, a, d, a), (a, a, c, a, a), and (a, b, a, a, a). The ﬁrst allocation is not in the core for E; let
S = {1, 2, 3, 5} and z2. A symmetric reasoning holds for the other three allocations. Contrast
this to the fact that for each economy E, the set of allocations that may be recommended
by a rule that satisﬁes the reciprocity lower bound is non-empty. Third, each selection from
the core correspondence satisﬁes the reciprocity lower bound : Let ϕ(E) = z be in the core
of E, and i, j ∈ N be such that zj = Ωi. Let S = {i, j}, then there is z′ ∈ Z(E) such that
z′i = Ωj and z
′
j = Ωiimplying ziRi Ωj. Lastly, there are rules that satisfy eﬃciency and
the reciprocity lower bound, but are not selections from the core. As in a previous example,
let ϕ be such that for E in Figure 2 on the right, ϕ(E) = (a, a, a, a, b, b, b, b). Notice that
ϕ(E) is not in the core of E, but ϕ may be extended to satisfy the two previous properties.
An allocation z ∈ Z(E) is in the weak core of E if there is no S ⊆ N and (z′S, z−S) ∈ Z(E)
such that for each i ∈ S, z′i ∈ ΩS and z′i Pi zi. The weak core is always non-empty (our
main rules serve as examples), but selections from the weak core correspondence may violate
both eﬃciency and the reciprocity lower bound : in the economy E in Figure 2 on the left,
z = (c, b, c, d, e) is in the weak core of E, but cannot be the recommendation of a rule
satisfying either of the two properties. Also, an allocation that is recommended by a rule
satisfying the reciprocity lower bound may fall outside of the weak core: the allocation where
each agent is assigned his endowment satisﬁes the property, but may not be in the weak core
e.g. if one agent top-ranks an object other than his endowment.
4 Rules
The family of serial priority rules is central in the study of resource allocation problems. We
introduce a second family of rules which are of particular interest.
4.1 Serial Priority w.r.t. σ
Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → N be an ordering of N . For each E ∈ E , each Z ⊆ Z(E), and each
i ∈ N , let Zi ≡ {x ∈ O : ∃z ∈ Z s.t. x = zi} be the assignments which are feasible for i in
the set Z.
• Let Z1 ≡ {z ∈ Z(E) : zσ(1) = arg maxZσ(1)(E) Rσ(1)}.
• Let Z2 ≡ {z ∈ Z1 : zσ(2) = arg maxZ1
σ(2)
Rσ(2)}.
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• ...
• Let Zn ≡ {z ∈ Zn−1 : zσ(n) = arg maxZn−1
σ(n)
Rσ(n)}.
Then, SP σ(E) ≡ Zn.
Example Serial Priority is not withholding-proof. Let σ(i) = i, and j = 12. The ﬁrst two
agents choose Ω13; the next three, Ω1; the next three, Ω2; the next three, Ω12. Next is agent
12 who top-ranks Ω13. Notice that it is not feasible for agent 12 to be assigned Ω13 given
the previous assignments. However, if agent 12 withholds, and the three agents who chose
Ω12 before now choose their own endowments, it is feasible for agent 13 to receive Ω12. 
This is surprising, given that Serial Priority is seen as a rigid rule satisfying strong in-
centive compatibility requirements. It indicates that manipulation by endowments is indeed
of a diﬀerent character than manipulation by preference misrepresentation.
4.2 Top Trading Cycles with Serial Inheritance w.r.t. σ
For each object a ∈ O, let ia be the owner of a. For each E ∈ E , and z ∈ Z(E), an object
a ∈ O is attainable given z and E if
1. in E, ia reports that Ωia = a, as opposed to Ω
′
ia = ∅,
2. for each j ∈ {` ∈ N : z` = ∅}, ∃z′ ∈ Z(E) s.t. for each i ∈ {` ∈ N : z` 6= ∅}, z′i = zi,
and z′j = a.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that the owner ia of a does not withhold a. Consider an agent j
who is assigned ∅ at z, and an allocation z′ which is the same as z, with the exception that
j is assigned a. The second condition requires that z′ is feasible given E, no matter which
unassigned agent j we select.18
Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → N be an ordering of N , and x0 = (∅, . . . , ∅). The top trading
cycles with serial inheritance w.r.t. σ, TTC − SIσ, rule is given by an algorithm as
follows:
Step 1: Construct a graph where each agent i ∈ N , and each attainable object given x0
and E is a node. Each object (besides ∅) points to its owner (forming a directed edge). Each
agent points to his most preferred object. If an agent points to ∅, then ∅ points back to him.
There is at least one cycle. Let x1 be such that 1) for each agent i who is in a cycle, x1i is
the object he points to, and 2) for each other agent, x1i = ∅. Each agent assigned an object
leaves. Each agent who was in a cycle leaves.
...
18We may weaken the deﬁnition of attainability to only require that at least some agent j can receive
the object a. In the following algorithm, for each allocation that can be reached after each Step, the two
deﬁnitions are equivalent. However, in general this weaker version does not imply the stated version (see
Section 6.3).
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Step k: If there are no remaining agents, then let ϕσ(E) = xk−1 and terminate. Construct
a graph where each remaining agent, and each object attainable given xk−1 and E is a
node. Each present object (besides ∅) points to its owner if he is remaining, otherwise the
earliest-priority remaining agent with respect to σ. Each remaining agent points to his most
preferred present object. If an agent points to ∅, then ∅ points back to him. There is at least
one cycle. Let xk be such that 1) for each agent i who has left before Step k, xki = x
k−1
i , 2)
for each agent i who is in a cycle, xki is the object he points to, and 3) for each other agent,
xki = ∅. Each agent who was in a cycle in this Step leaves. 
TTC − SIσ is a modiﬁcation of TTC in that between each step of assigning objects
along cycles, there is an additional process of determining the attainable objects. For T = 2,
this process is O(n log(n)).19 Since there are at most n steps of assigning cycles, checking
attainability adds O(n2 log(n)) additional operations to TTC. Since TTC is polynomial time,
TTC − SIσ is as well.
Example Let E = (R,Ω) ∈ E be as below, and for each i ∈ N , σ(i) = i.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
b a a a a
a b c d e
Step 1: Agents 1 and 2 form the only cycle. Then, x1 = (b, a, ∅, ∅, ∅).
Step 2: Notice a and b are attainable given x1 under E. For example, the allocation
y = (b, a, a, ∅, ∅) adds to the allocation x1 by assigning agent 3 object a. Thus, y is feasible
as there is a transfer process (shown below) which results in y.
Round 1 Round 2
1
a−→ 2 1 a−→ 3
2
b−→ 1
Objects a and b point to the earliest-remaining priority agent 3. Since all agents point
to a, but a points to 3, the only cycle is with agent 3. Then, x2 = (b, a, a, ∅, ∅).
Step 3: Objects a and b are attainable given x2 under E. The only cycle is with agent
4, and x3 = (b, a, a, a, ∅).
Step 4: Object a is not attainable given x3 under E, so it is removed from the algorithm;
b is still attainable given x3 under E, and so points at 5. Since 5's most preferred object is
e, he points to e and forms a cycle with e. Then, x4 = (b, a, a, a, e).
Step 5: No agents remain, so TTC − SIσ(E) = x4. 
19This calculation is performed in the Supplementary Appendix.
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5 Results
SP σ TTC − SIσ
Eﬃciency + +
Strategy-proofness + +
Group Strategy-proofness + +
Withholding-proofness  +
Group Withholding-proofness  
Reciprocity Lower Bound  +
Theorem 1 TTC−SIσ satisﬁes eﬃciency, group strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness,
and the reciprocity lower bound.
This result is encouraging, since very few economic environments allow for the simul-
taneity of such strong incentive compatibility, eﬃciency, and fairness notions. Furthermore,
the structure of algorithm is rather straightforward; the familiar trade along cycles intu-
ition of TTC comprises a key component of each step. Can we include a more ﬂexibility
in the inheritance structure rather than having one agent inherit all the attainable objects?
We discuss this possibility in Section 6.3. In Appendix 2, we show that the properties are
independent.
Let ϕ ≡ TTC − SIσ. For each E ∈ E , let k¯(E) be the last step of the algorithm under
E. For each E ∈ E , and k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯(E)}, Step k under E refers to the kth step of the
algorithm run for economy E, and xk under E refers to current allocation at the kth step
of the algorithm run for economy E. Let V be the step under E at which i receives his
assignment. For the sake of brevity, i points to j means i points to an object which points
to j. A cycle is a set of agents i1, . . . , im s.t. i1 points to i2 points to... im points to i1.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Eﬃciency : Consider E ∈ E . For each k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯(E)}, let Sk be the set of agents at Step
k who are assigned an object. Let τ be the ordering of N as follows: the ﬁrst |S1| agents in
τ comprise of agents in S1, the next |S2| agents in τ comprise of agents in S2, ... and so on.
Then, ϕ(E) = SP τ (E). Since SP τ (E) is eﬃcient for E, ϕ(E) is eﬃcient for E.
Group strategy-proofness : In this setting, strategy-proofness and non-bossiness imply group
strategy-proofness (Pápai, 2000)20, we will show each of these two properties are satisﬁed.
The proof for strategy-proofness is similar to (Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 1999). The proof
for non-bossiness and withholding-proofness are provided in Appendix 1.
20Although this paper considers a diﬀerent model, the proof for this statement holds in ours as well.
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Lemma 1 For each E ∈ E , and each k ∈ {2, . . . , k¯(E)}, the set of attainable objects given
xk under E is contained in the set of attainable objects given xk−1 under E. More generally,
for each E ∈ E , if x, x′ ∈ Z(E) and for each i ∈ N s.t. xi 6= ∅, xi = x′i, then the set of
attainable objects given x′ is contained in the set of attainable objects given x.
Proof: Let a ∈ O be attainable given x′ and E. That is,
1. ∃i ∈ N s.t. Ωi = a, and
2. ∃z′ ∈ Z(E) and j ∈ {` ∈ N : x′` = ∅} s.t. for each i ∈ {` ∈ N : x′` 6= ∅}, z′i = x′i, and
z′j = a.
This means there is t′ such that for each i ∈ N , z′i ∈ yi(t′). Let z be an allocation such that
for each h ∈ {` ∈ N : x` = ∅}, zh = ∅, i ∈ {` ∈ N : x` 6= ∅}, zi = xi, and zj = a. Since for
each i ∈ N , zi ∈ yi(t′), z ∈ Z(E). This implies a is attainable given x and E. 
Strategy-proofness : Let E ∈ E and i ∈ N . Let V ′ be the Step at which i receives his
assignment under E ′ ≡ (R′i, R−i,Ω) ∈ E . If ϕi(E) = ϕi(E ′), then we are done. So let
ϕi(E) 6= ϕi(E ′).
Case 1: V ′ ≤ V . Allocations x1, . . . , xV ′−1 under E and E ′ are the same. By deﬁnition,
i is in a cycle S at Step V ′ under E ′. Hence, at Step V ′, . . . , V under E, each agent in the
cycle S\i points to the same object, implying ϕ(E)Pi ϕ(E ′).
Case 2: V ′ > V . At Step V ′ under E ′, i points to an object a ∈ O ∪ ∅. By deﬁnition, a
is attainable given xV
′−1 under E ′. Suppose aRi ϕi(E). By assumption of ϕi(E) 6= ϕi(E ′),
aPi ϕi(E). Steps 1, . . . , V − 1 under E and E ′ are the same, implying for xV−1 under E and
xV
′
under E ′, and each i ∈ N s.t. xV−1i 6= ∅, xV−1i = xV ′i . Hence, by Lemma 1, the set of
attainable objects given xV
′−1 is contained in the set of attainable objects given xV−1. Since
a is attainable given xV
′−1 under E ′, a is attainable given xV−1 under E. Hence, at Step V
under E, i points to a 6= ϕi(E), contradicting the deﬁnition of the rule.
Reciprocity Lower Bound : Let J be the set of j ∈ N s.t. there is a step at which j points
to Ωi. For each j ∈ J , let kj be the ﬁrst step at which j points to i. If kj ≤ V , then j still
points to i until Step V . If kj > V , then by deﬁnition, j has not been assigned an object at
Step V . Hence, for each j ∈ J , Ωj is attainable given xV−1. By deﬁnition, i is assigned the
object he points to at Step V , implying that for each j ∈ J , ϕi(E)Ri Ωj.
Notice that the statements for eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, and the reciprocity lower
bound also hold for the case when T > 2.
These four axioms do not characterize the TTC − SIσ family of ruleswe provide an
example in Appendix 2 of a rule outside this family. Does a strengthening of withholding-
proofness to its group version brings us closer? Unfortunately, such a strengthening ends in
incompatibility.
Theorem 2 No rule satisﬁes eﬃciency, group strategy-proofness, group withholding-proofness,
and the reciprocity lower bound.
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Proof of Theorem 2: Let ϕ be a rule satisfying eﬃciency, group strategy-proofness, group
withholding-proofness, and the reciprocity lower bound. Let E ∈ E be as below. For each
i ∈ N , ΩiRi ∅.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R
′
3
a c a c c c a
b b d e f d
c c
By eﬃciency, ϕ3(E) = a. Let E
1 ≡ (R,Ω1 = ∅,Ω−1). By eﬃciency and the reciprocity
lower bound, ϕ3(E
1) = b and ϕ2(E
1) = c. Hence, by group withholding-proofness, ϕ2(E) = c.
Let E2 ≡ (R′3, R−3,Ω) and E2A ≡ (R′3, R−3,Ω1 = ∅,Ω−1). By eﬃciency and the reci-
procity lower bound, ϕ3(E
2A) = d and ϕ4(E
2A) = c. Hence, by group withholding-proofness,
ϕ4(E
2) = c. By group strategy-proofness, ϕ4(E) = c. Analagously, ϕ5(E) = ϕ6(E) = c.
However, this violates feasibility, since c is assigned to 4 > 2T − 1 agents. 
6 Extensions
We consider two generalizations of the previous model. In the ﬁrst, each agent consumes
multiple objects, and may own multiple objects.21 In the second, agents live in a network
represented by a graph, and can only transfer to adjacent agents. The results are more
disappointing than those in the simple model.
Next we may wonder if we can deﬁne inheritance trees, and trade along cycles as in
(Pa´pai, 2000). We attempt to construct such a rule, and show it is not well-deﬁned.
6.1 Agents Consume Bundles
Let O = {a, b, c, . . . } be the ﬁnite set of objects, and N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents.
The consumption space of each agent is 2O ∪ ∅. Write the set {a, b, c} as abc.
Let S be the set of strict preference relations over 2O. Given Ri ∈ S, an object x ∈ O is
desirable for i if xRi ∅; let Di ⊆ O be the set of desirable objects for i. Below we list
three conditions on preferences.
Consistency w.r.t. absolute desirability For each x ∈ Di, and each S ⊆ Di\x, S ∪
xRi S.
Consistency w.r.t. relative desirability For each x, y ∈ Di, and each S ⊆ Di, xRi y ⇐⇒
S ∪ xRi S ∪ y.
Consistency w.r.t. undesirability For each x ∈ O\Di, and each S ⊆ O, ∅Ri S ∪ x.
Let R ⊂ S be the domain of preferences satisfying the three conditions above (also known
as responsive preferences (Roth, 1985)). The domain R excludes preference relations with
21When objects are fully private goods, eﬃciency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness are incom-
patible (So¨nmez, 1999). This result does not hold in our model because individual rationality is trivially
satisﬁed, as agents always keep a copy of their own object.
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complementaritiesif a, b, c ∈ O are such that aPi b Pi c Pi ∅, then ab Pi bc. Let R =
{Ri}i∈N ∈ RN denote a proﬁle of preferences.
The same technology as in the previous section is available. An economy and pre-
allocation are deﬁned as before. However, an allocation is a list specifying for each agent i a
set of objects in O. An allocation z is feasible if for each i ∈ N , there is a transfer process t
resulting in a pre-allocation y(t) such that zi ⊆ yi(t).
We modify the deﬁnition of reciprocity lower bound in this extension. If agent j receives k
number of objects which originally came from i's endowment, then i should have the right
to any k objects from j's endowment. If agent j1 and j2 each receive k1 and k2 objects which
originally came from i's endowment, then i should have the right to any bundle consisting
of k1 (or fewer) of j1's endowment and k2 (or fewer) of j2's endowment. A similar statement
holds if 3 agents receive i's objects.
For each E ∈ E , each z ∈ Z(E), and each i, j ∈ N , let kij(z, E) = |Ωi ∩ zj| and
Xi(z, E) ≡ {x ⊆ O : |x| ≤ T & for each j ∈ N\i, |xi ∩ Ωj| ≤ kij(z, E)}. That is, Xi(z, E)
is the set of bundles i may choose from if he had the right to kij(z, E) objects from the
endowment of j. Let X¯i(z, E) ≡ Ωi ∪ {arg maxXi(z,E) Ri}.
Reciprocity lower bound: For each E(R,Ω) ∈ E , and each i ∈ N , ϕi(E)Ri X¯i(ϕ(E), E).
In environments where agents are endowed with and consume bundles, and replicability is
not possible 1) eﬃciency and withholding-proofness are incompatible and 2) eﬃciency, indi-
vidual rationality, and strategy-proofness are incompatible (Atlamaz & Klaus, 2007; So¨nmez,
1999; Konishi, Quint, & Wako, 2001).
With replicability, we also see the contrast between the simple and more general case.
The four properties that were compatible before, are now incompatible.
Theorem 3 No rule satisﬁes eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness, and the
reciprocity lower bound.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let E = (R,Ω) ∈ E be as below. For each i ∈ N , and each z ⊆ O,
z Ri ∅.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R
′
4 R
′′
4
e e g a f f A : (abe, cdeb, efgd, gac)
f b d c c a B : (abef, cdeb, efgd, gc)
ab cd ef f a g C : (abef, cde, efgd, gac)
g g
The set of allocations satisfying eﬃciency and the reciprocity lower bound is {A,B,C}
deﬁned above.
Case 1: ϕ(E) = A. Let Ω′1 = a. By eﬃciency, ϕ(R,Ω−1,Ω
′
1) = C. Agent 1 has incentive
to withhold.
Case 2: ϕ(E) = B. Let R′4 be as above. By eﬃciency and the reciprocity lower bound,
ϕ(R′4, R−4,Ω) = (abe, cdeb, efgd, gcf). Agent 4 has incentive to misreport his preference.
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Case 3: ϕ(E) = C. Let Ω′2 = d, and E
3 ≡ (R,Ω′2,Ω−2). By eﬃciency and the reciprocity
lower bound, ϕ(E3) is either D ≡ (abef, cde, efgd, ga), or F ≡ (abe, cdeb, efgd, gaf). Let R′′4
be as above, and E4 ≡ (R−4, R′′4,Ω−2,Ω′2). By eﬃciency and the reciprocity lower bound,
ϕ(E4) = (abe, cdeb, efgd, gaf). Hence, ϕ(E3) = F , otherwise agent 4 may beneﬁt from
misreporting his preference. So ϕ2(E
3)R2 ϕ2(E), giving agent 2 incentive to withhold. 
6.2 Network Constraints
Consider the following extension to the model. A network is G ⊆ N ×N s.t.
• for each g = (g1, g2) ∈ G, g1 6= g2, and
• if (g1, g2) ∈ G, then (g2, g1) ∈ G.
Let G be the set of all networks. For each network G ∈ G, each agent may only replicate
and transfer to adjacent agents in G. Hence, the feasibility constraints become:
N1 In the ﬁrst round, each agent i may replicate one object in his endowment, and transfer
this copy to another agent j, only if (i, j) ∈ G.
N2 In each subsequent round, each agent imay replicate either one object in his endowment,
or one of the objects he received in a previous round, and transfer this copy to another
agent j, only if (i, j) ∈ G.
N3 In each round, each agent may transfer and receive only one object.
Let E ≡ G × RN × ON be the set of economies. A feasible allocation, and rule are deﬁned
as before.
Eﬃciency and strategy-proofness are compatiblethe serial priority rule is an example.
However, in a large class of networks, eﬃciency is compatible with neither withholding-
proofness nor the reciprocity lower bound.
A path in G is a sequence of agents i1, i2, . . . , im ∈ N such that for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m−
1}, (ik, ik+1) ∈ G. The length of a path i1, . . . , im is m− 1.
Theorem 4 If there is i, j ∈ N s.t. (i, j) /∈ G, and there is only one path of length T from
i to j, then
1. no rule satisﬁes eﬃciency and withholding-proofness, and
2. no rule satisﬁes eﬃciency and the reciprocity lower bound.
If there is a pair of agents such that the only path to each other is only by an intermediate
agent, then incompatibilities arise. Note that this connectivity property does not preclude
the pair of agents from having multiple connecting paths of length ` > T , so large classes
of networks satisfy this property. Furthermore, it is clear that T plays an important role
in this connectivity condition. Transferring an object from i to j takes exactly T rounds
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and the usage of the path from i to j; hence, at each Round, there is agent k on this path
is transferring i's object to the next agent. Such an arrangement unfortunately precludes
transferring an object from j to i: if we attempt to do this, then there will be a Round where
an agent must simultaneously transfer Ωi and Ωj to two diﬀerent agents.
Theorem 4 is disappointing given that in applications it is very possible agents are network
constrained.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let E = (G,R,Ω) ∈ E satisfy the hypothesis above, and i, `, j ∈ N
be the path of length T = 2 from i to j. For each i ∈ N , and each y ∈ O, y Ri ∅. Let
(Rh,Ωh)h∈{i,`,k} be as below. Let R−{i,`,k} be such that
• for each j ∈ N\{i, `, k}, and each z ∈ {i, `, k}, ∅Rj Ωz, and
• for each f ∈ {i, k}, and each j, h ∈ N s.t. (j, z), (h, z) ∈ G and h 6= j, ∅Rj Ωh.
Ri R` Rk Round 1 Round 2
c a a i
a−→ `
b c b `
b−→ i ` a−→ k
a b c
Let ϕi`k(E) = (ϕi(E), ϕ`(E), ϕk(E)). By eﬃciency, ϕi`k(E) is either 1) (b, a, a), or 2)
(c, c, b).
Withholding-proofness :
Case 1: ϕi`k(E) = (b, a, a). Let E
′ = (G,R,Ω′i = ∅,Ω−i). By eﬃciency, ϕi`k(E ′) =
(c, c, b). Hence, i is made better oﬀ, in violation of withholding-proofness.
Case 2: ϕi`k(E) = (c, c, b). Let E
′′ = (G,R,Ω′k = ∅,Ω−k). By eﬃciency, ϕi`k(E ′′) =
(b, a, a). Hence, k is made better oﬀ, in violation of withholding-proofness.
Reciprocity lower bound :
Case 1: ϕi`k(E) = (b, a, a). Then, X¯i(ϕ(E), E) = cRi b = ϕi(E), in violation of reci-
procity lower bound.
Case 2: ϕi`k(E) = (c, c, b). Then, X¯k(ϕ(E), E) = aRk b = ϕk(E), in violation of reci-
procity lower bound. 
6.3 Trading Along Cycles with Inheritance Trees
In this section we ask if we may extend TTC with inheritance trees to our setting (Pa´pai,
2000). We attempt to construct such a rule, and show it is not well-deﬁned. The idea is the
following: In the TTC − SIσ rules, at each Step a single agent inherits all the attainable
objects without an owner. Here, we show that if we allow for several agents to inherit
attainable objects, then there is a clash with feasibility.
A (previous owner assignment) conditional priority list for object a, σa, speciﬁes
• an initial agent (who is the owner of the object),
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• for each possible object this initial agent is assigned, speciﬁes a second agent who
inherits a,
• for each possible object this second agent is assigned, speciﬁes a third agent who
inherits a, and so on.
A conditional priority list, σ, is a collection of the above, one for each agent.
Deﬁne a rule as follows: Construct a graph with agents and objects as nodes. In Step
1, each object points to its initial agent, each agent points to his most preferred object, and
for each cycle, assign agents the object they point to. Remove assigned agents and objects.
In Step 2, each object for which 1) is still attainable given the partial allocation in Step 1,
and 2) its initial agent has been assigned, points to a second agent (this may depends the
assignment of the initial agent). Then, each unassigned agent points to his most preferred
(attainable) object, and the process is repeated. A formal treatment of the original family
of rules are in (Pa´pai, 2000).
The following example shows that this rule is not well-deﬁned.
Let E ∈ E be as below. The column R5,6,7 indicates the preference relations R5 = R6 =
R7.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5,6,7 R8,9,10 R11,12,13
∅ a a a a a a
a b c d b c d
Let the conditional priority list σ be such that a points to 1, then for each possible object
that 1 is assigned, a points to 2, 3, then 4. At Step 1, 1 points to ∅ and is assigned ∅. At
Step 2, a points to 2, 2 is assigned a. At Steps 3 and 4, 3 and 4 are assigned a. Let σ
be such that b, c, and d also point at 1, 2, 3, then 4. At Step 5, a is no longer attainable
given the partial allocation at Step 4. Let σ be such that b now points to 5, c points to 8,
and d points to 11. Then, at Step 5, agents 5, 8, and 11 are assigned object b, c, and d,
respectively. Let σ be such that b, c, and d now point to 6, 9, and 10. Then, at Step 6, 6,
9, and 10 are assigned b, c, and d. Notice that given the partial allocation at Step 6, b, c,
and d are still attainable. Let σ be such that b, c, and d point at 11, 12, and 13. Then, at
Step 7, agents 11, 12, and 13 are in a cycle with b, c, and d. So the rule assigns them these
objects. However, (∅, a, a, a, b, b, b, c, c, c, d, d, d) is not feasible. In the transfer process for
this allocation, there is at least one agent in {2, 3, 4} who is helping 1 transfer a to another
agent in R2. Without loss of generality, let 2 be this agent. Then, 2 may transfer b to, say,
5 in R1; and 5 may transfer b to, say, 6 in R2. Since 2 is already transferring a in R2, he
cannot transfer b to 7.
7 Conclusion
We study a resource allocation problem wherein each agent may replicate and transfer an
object in his possession to another agentand there is a limited amount of time to do so.
When each agent owns one object and consumes only one object, we identify a family of
rules satisfying eﬃciency, group-strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness, and the reciprocity
lower bound. If we consider the case where each agent owns bundles of objects and consumes
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bundles, then no rule satisﬁes the four properties. If agents live in a network, then we
show that for a large class of networks, eﬃciency is compatible with strategy-proofness, but
unfortunately, neither of the other two properties.
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Appendix 1
In Appendix 1.1, we show that TTC−SIσ satisﬁes non-bossiness. In Appendix 1.2, we show
TTC − SIσ satisﬁes withholding-proofness. Let ϕ ≡ TTC − SIσ.
1.1 Non-bossiness
Non-bossiness: For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , each i ∈ N , and each R′i ∈ R, if ϕi(E) =
ϕi(R
′
i, R−i,Ω), then
ϕ(E) = ϕ(R′i, R−i,Ω).
Let E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , and E ′ = (R′i, R−i,Ω) ∈ E be s.t. ϕi(E ′) = ϕi(E). For each
k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯(E)}, let
• Nk ≡ {M ⊆ N : each i ∈M is a remaining agent at Step k under E},
• W k ≡ {w ∈ 2N : w = {w1, . . . , wz}, and at Step k under E, wz points to wz−1 points
to... w1 points to Ωi},
• Sk ≡ {s ∈ 2N : s is a cycle s1, . . . , sz at Step k under E, and there is no t ∈ s s.t.
t ∈ ⋃g∈{1,...,k}⋃w∈W g w}, and
• Uk ≡ {s ∈ 2N\Sk : s is a cycle s1, . . . , sz at Step k under E},
At Step k, Sk and Uk are the set of cycles which occur (Figure 3). In each cycle in Sk, no
agent receives Ωi; while in U
k, some agent receives Ωi. At Step k, each s ∈ W k forms a
pointing chain of agents for which the last agent points to Ωi.
Let V be the Step under E at which i is assigned his object, and W ∈ W V be s.t. i ∈ W .
Let Q be the ﬁrst Step under E at which the cycle W forms. Let V ′ be the Step under E ′ at
which i is assigned his object. For each j ∈ N , let C(j, E) ⊆ N be the cycle j is in under E.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , V − 1}, since i is not assigned yet, Uk = ∅. For each k ∈ {V, . . . , k¯(E)},
either Uk = ∅, or there is only one cycle in Uk. Abusing notation, write Uk as this cycle.
The proof proceeds by showing that each cycle occurring in the algorithm under E occurs
under E ′. Furthermore, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯(E)}, each cycle occurring at Step k under
E may not occur at an earlier round. This can be shown using the technique in Step 3 of
Claim 4.
Case 1: V ′ = V . At Step 1 under E and E ′, each agent j ∈ N\{i} points to the same
object, the same cycles S1 occur, and U1 = ∅. Since x1 under E and E ′ are the same, the
set of attainable objects objects at Step 2 under E and E ′ are the same. Furthermore, N2
agents remain at Step 2 under E and E ′.
Iterating this reasoning for Steps 2, . . . , k¯(E), we have x2, . . . , xk¯(E) under E and E ′ are
the same, implying ϕ(E ′) = ϕ(E). Note that i may point to diﬀerent objects at Step
k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯(E)− 1}, but since he is not in a cycle, this does not matter.
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Step E E ′
1 S1 S1
...
...
...
V SV UV = C(i, E) SV
...
...
...
...
V ′ SV
′
UV
′
SV
′
UV = C(i, E)
...
...
...
Figure 3: The schematic above shows the steps of the algorithm under E and E′ when V ′ > V .
Underneath the column E, S1 and U1 are particular sets of cycles which occur at Step 1, and
similarly for each other row. Claim 1 shows cycles SV , . . . , SV
′
occur under E′; Claim 2 shows UV ′
occurs under E′.
We consider the case when V ′ > V . If V ′ < V , then a symmetric reasoning holds after
re-labelling.
Case 2: V ′ > V . Following the reasoning of Case 1, for each j ∈ ⋃g∈{1,...,V }⋃s∈Sg s,
ϕj(E) = ϕj(E
′). So each agent belonging to a cycle not involving i at Steps 1, . . . , V receives
the same assignment under E and E ′. Since V ′ > V , the cycle C(i, E) does not occur at
Step V under E ′.
Lemma 2 If V ′ > V , then for Step V under E, there is no h ∈ ⋃k∈{1,...,V }⋃s∈Wk s s.t.
h is the earliest-priority remaining agent.
If V ′ > V , then at Step V under E ′, i does not point to ϕi(E). If there is an agent that
1) points to an object that points to an agent... that points to Ωi in any Step from 1 to V
under E, and 2) is the earliest-priority agent at Step V under E, then i will be assigned the
object he points to at Step V under E ′violating the assumption that ϕi(E) = ϕi(E ′).
Proof: Suppose by contradiction, there is k ∈ {1, . . . , V }, and h ∈ ⋃s∈Wk s s.t. h is the
earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V under E, and hence also at Step V under E ′.
Since V ′ > V , at Step V under E ′, i does not point at an agent in
⋃
s∈Wk s (otherwise, he is
in a cycle). Then, i points to an object a 6= ϕi(E) that points to ` ∈ N , and aR′i ϕi(E). If
Ω` 6= a, then ` = h, i is in a cycle, and a = ϕi(E ′) 6= ϕi(E)violating the assumption that
ϕi(E) = ϕi(E
′). If Ω` = a, then either 1) ` is in a cycle with i, implying a = ϕi(E ′) 6= ϕi(E),
or 2) ` is in a cycle, but not with i. First, in Step V + 1 under E ′ (after ` is in a cycle),
for each s ∈ W k, each agent in s still points to the same object as in Step V under E ′, and
hence, the same as in Step V under E. Second, since only one agent was assigned a, and
no agent has been assigned Ωi, a is still attainable at Step V + 1 under E
′. Since h is the
earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V under E ′, he is so at Step V + 1 under E ′. Then,
i points to object a points to h, and by deﬁnition of h ∈ ⋃s∈Wk s, h = wz points to wz−1
points to... points to w1 points to Ωi points to i. Then, a = ϕi(E
′) 6= ϕi(E). 
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Since C(i, E) ∈ W V , Lemma 2 implies no h ∈ C(i, E) is earliest at Step V under E.
Hence, for each h ∈ C(i, E), at Step V under E ′, h points to an object in ⋃j∈C(i,E) Ωj. At
Steps V + 1, . . . , V ′, each h ∈ C(i, E)\{i} still points to the same agent, implying C(i, E)
occurs at Step V ′ under E ′.
Claim 1 For each j ∈ ⋃k∈{0,...,V ′−V }⋃s∈SV+k s, ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E). Furthermore, for each
k ∈ {0, . . . , V ′ − V }, the set of cycles SV+k occurs at Step V + k under E and E ′, and for
each k ∈ {1, . . . , V ′ − V − 1}, UV+k = ∅.
Proof: We have shown above that for each j ∈ ⋃s∈SV s , ϕj(E) = ϕj(E ′), and the set of
cycles SV occurs at Step V under E and E ′.
Step 1: For each j ∈ ⋃k∈{0,...,V ′−V }⋃s∈SV+k s, ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E), and for each k ∈
{0, . . . , V ′ − V }, the set of cycles SV+k occurs at Step V + k under E and E ′. We
proceed by induction. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , V ′− V − 1}, let Case k be deﬁned as below. For
each j ∈ ⋃g∈{0,...,V+k−1}⋃s∈SV+g , suppose ϕj(E) = ϕj(E ′). For each g ∈ {0, . . . , V + k − 1},
suppose 1) Sg occurs at Step V + g under E and E ′, and 2) UV+g = ∅.
Subcase 2.k: j ∈ ⋃s∈SV+k s. Then, at Step V under E and E ′, j either points to an
agent h in SV , SV+1,..., SV+k, or C(i, E). Since UV+1 = · · · = UV+k+−1 = ∅, j cannot point
to an agent in UV+1,..., or UV+k−1.
Subcase 2.k.1: h is in C(i, E). Then, h still points to i until Step V ′ under E ′, implying
j still points to i at least until Step V ′ under E ′. Since V ′ > V + k, this is impossible.
Subcase 2.k.2: h is in SV , . . . , SV+k−1. First, we show the set of attainable objects at
V +k under E and E ′ are the same. Suppose by contradiction, there is an object b such that
b is attainable at Step V + k under E ′, but not attainable at Step V + k under E. At Steps
V, . . . , V + k − 1 under E ′, only one less cycle occurred compared to E: C(i, E). Hence,
the occurrence of C(i, E) at Step V under E causes the unattainability of b. If for each
` ∈ C(i, E), ϕ`(E) ∈
⋃
s∈C(i,E) Ωs, then each c ∈
⋃
s∈C(i,E) Ωs is still attainable at Step V + k
under E ′. Hence, there are `, `′ ∈ C(i, E) such that ϕ`(E) /∈
⋃
s∈C(i,E) Ωs, and ϕ`(E) 6= Ω`′
points to `′. Since `′ ∈ ⋃s∈WV+k s, by Lemma 2, this is impossible. So the set of attainable
objects is the same at V + k under E and E ′.
Let M ≡ NV+k ∪ C(i, E), and ` ≡ arg maxg∈M σ−1(g) be the earliest-priority remaining
agent at V + k under E ′. Since ` /∈ C(i, E), ` = arg maxg∈M\C(i,E) σ−1(g), and ` is the
earliest-priority remaining agent at V + k under E. Hence, if c is in the set of attainable
objects given xV+k−1 under E, and not in
⋃
h∈C(i,E) Ωh, then c points to the same agent j
c
at Step V + k under E and E ′.
At Step V + k under E and E ′, j cannot point to an object in
⋃
g∈C(i,E) Ωg, because the
reasoning of Case 2.k.1 would hold. So since the set of attainable objects is the same at
Step V + k under E and E ′, j points to the same object c at both Steps. As shown in the
previous paragraph, c points to the same agent jc at both Steps.
Hence, j points to the same agent at V + k under E and E ′.
Subcase 2.k.3: h is in SV+k. Then, since each object and agent still points to the same
agent g until g leaves, at Step V + k under E and E ′, j points to the same agent.
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Hence, for each j ∈ ⋃s∈SV+k s, at Step V + k under E ′ and E, j points to the same
object, which in turn points to the same agent. The same set of cycles SV+k occurs, and
ϕj(E
′) = ϕj(E). Subcase 2.k is complete.
Step 2: UV+k = ∅. Let M ≡ NV+k ∪ C(i, E). Suppose by contradiction UV+k 6= ∅, then
at Step V + k under E there are u1, . . . , uz ∈ UV+k and j ∈ {u1, . . . , uz} s.t. j = uz points
to uz−1 points to... u1 points to Ωi points to j. This means, j = arg minh∈M\C(i,E) σ−1(h).
Consider Step V under E ′. Let h be the earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V under
E ′.
If h = i, then since V ′ 6= V , i points to a 6= ϕi(E). If the owner of a remains, then i still
points to him. By ﬁniteness of the algorithm, there is g ∈ N s.t. the owner of a is assigned
at V + g under E ′, and at Step V + g + 1 under E ′, a points to i and ϕi(E ′) = a. If the
owner of a does not remain, then i is in a cycle with a, and ϕi(E
′) = a. This contradicts the
hypothesis that ϕi(E) = ϕi(E
′).
If h ∈ ⋃g∈{0,...,k−1}⋃s∈SV+g s, then there are two cases. At Step V + k under E ′, i points
to either an object a 6= ϕi(E), or ϕi(E). Let ja be the owner of a.
Case 1: At Step V + k under E, i points to a 6= ϕi(E), and ja is a remaining
agent. By ﬁniteness of the algorithm, there is a f ∈ {k, . . . , k¯(E)− V } such that at Step
V + f under E ′, ja is in a cycle. At Step V + k under E ′, the facts that M agents remain
and j = arg minh∈M\C(i,E) σ−1(h) imply the earliest-priority remaining agent ` is such that
` ∈ C(i, E) ∪ j. Since the set of remaining agents is contained in M , ` is still the earliest-
priority remaining agent at Step V + f + 1 under E ′. So a now points to `.
Subcase 1.1: ` = j. By reasoning of Subcase 2.k.2, for each u ∈ UV+k, at Step V + k
under E and E ′, u points to the same object, which in turn points to the same agent. Recall,
by deﬁnition of j and UV+k, at Step V + k under E, j = uz points to uz−1 points to... u1
points to Ωi points to j. Since i is a remaining agent, at Step V + k under E
′, we have
j = uz points to uz−1 points to... u1 points to Ωi points to i points to a. Each agent still
points in this manner until Step V + f + 1 under E ′. At Step V + f + 1 under E ′, j is the
earliest-priority remaining agent, and a points to j. Then, since i points to a, a cycle forms
and ϕi(E
′) = a 6= ϕi(E), a contradiction to the hypothesis.
Subcase 1.2: ` ∈ C(i, E). Similarly as above, at Step V + f + 1 under E ′, a points to
`. Hence, there is a cycle {uz, . . . , u1} ⊆ C(i, E) such that ` = uz points to uz−1 points to...
u1 points to Ωi points to i points to a. Then, ϕi(E
′) = a 6= ϕi(E), a contradiction.
Case 2: At Step V + k under E ′, i points to ϕi(E). At Step V under E and E ′,
since xV−1 under E and E ′ are the same, each remaining agent points to the same object.
Consider agents in the cycle C(i, E). Lemma 2 implies that for each g ∈ C(i, E), g points
to an object a such that a ∈ ⋃j∈C(i,E) Ωj. Hence, at Steps V, . . . , V + k under E ′, each
24
g ∈ C(i, E)\i still points to the same agent. Hence, if i points to ϕi(E), then i is in a cycle
at Step V + k under E ′. Since V + k < V ′, this is impossible. 
Claim 2 For each j ∈ UV ′ , ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E).
Proof: If UV
′
= ∅, then we are done. Let UV ′ 6= ∅ be a cycle.
Step 1: There is an agent in u who is the earliest-priority remaining agent at
Step V ′+ 1 under E ′. At Step V ′ under E, by deﬁnition, there is an agent in UV
′
who is
assigned Ωi. Since V
′ > V , i /∈ NV ′ and Ωi points to another agent ` ∈ UV ′ . At Step V ′ + 1
under E ′, only one extra cycle has already occurred compared to Step V ′ under E: SV
′
.
Hence, the set of remaining agents at Step V ′ under E contains the set of remaining agents
at Step V ′ + 1 under E ′. Since ` is earliest at Step V ′ under E, this implies ` is earliest at
Step V ′ + 1 under E ′.
Step 2: Each j ∈ UV ′ points to the same object at Step V ′ under E and Step V ′+1
under E ′. Let a be the object j points to at Step V ′ under E, and b be the object j points
to at Step V ′+ 1 under E ′. Suppose by contradiction, a 6= b. Then at Step V ′ under E, a is
attainable given xV
′−1 under E. At Step V ′ under E, the cycles S1, . . . , SV
′−1, C(i, E) have
occurred; at Step V ′ + 1 under E ′, the cycles S1, . . . , SV
′
, C(i, E) have occurred. Hence, at
Step V ′ + 1 under E ′ the only extra set of cycles which occurs is SV
′
. If each cycle s ∈ SV ′
is s.t. s = u1, . . . , uz and uz points to Ωuz−1 points to uz−1 points to Ωuz−2 points to... Ωu1
points to u1 points to Ωz, then each object which points to an agent in S
V ′ is still attainable.
Hence, there must be a cycle s ∈ SV ′ and j ∈ s s.t. j does not point to an object in ⋃g∈s Ωg.
This means some agent `′ ∈ s is the earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V ′ under E.
This is impossible, as we showed in Step 1, ` ∈ UV ′ is the earliest-priority remaining agent.
Step 2 implies UV
′
occurs at Step V ′+ 1 under E ′, and for each j ∈ UV ′ , ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E). 
For each k ∈ {V ′ + 1, . . . , k¯(E)}, let
• Qk ≡ {s ∈ 2N : s is a cycle at Step k under E, and for each j ∈ s, there is h ∈ s s.t. j
points to Ωh}, and
• T k ≡ {s ∈ 2N : s is a cycle at Step k under E, and there is j ∈ T k and a ∈ O s.t. j
points to a, and a /∈ ⋃h∈Tk Ωh}.
That is, at Step k under E, Qk is the set of cycles which only involve the endowments of the
agents in the cycle, and T k is the cycle for which one agent points to an object whose owner
has left.
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Claim 3 For each j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+1∪TV ′+1 s, ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E). Furthermore, the cycles QV ′+1
and T V
′+1 both occur either at V ′ + 1 under E ′ or V ′ + 2 under E ′.
Proof: If UV
′
= ∅, then at Step V ′+1 under E and E ′, the same cycles S1, . . . , SV ′ , C(i, E)
have occurred. Hence, xV
′
under E and E ′ is the same, the set of remaing agents is the same,
and each remaining agent at Step V ′ + 1 points to the same object under E and E ′. So the
same cycles QV
′+1 and T V
′+1 occur at Step V ′ + 1 under E ′.
If UV
′ 6= ∅, then before Step V ′ under E, the cycles S1, . . . , SV ′−1, C(i, E) have occurred.
At Step V ′ − 1 under E ′, only the cycles S1, . . . , SV ′−1 have occurred.
Step 1: No agent assigned in Steps V +1, . . . , V ′−1 under E is assigned an object in⋃
s∈C(i,E) Ωs. Suppose by contradiction, there is j ∈
⋃
g∈{1,...,V ′−V−1}
⋃
s∈SV+g s, h ∈ C(i, E),
and k ∈ {1, . . . , V ′ − V − 1} s.t. j points to Ωh at Step V + k under E. By Claim 2, SV+k
cycles occur at Step V + k under E ′. Since h is not assigned until V ′, Ωh still points to h
until V ′. Since V ′ > V + k, j cannot have received Ωh at Step V + k under E ′.
Step 2: The set of attainable objects at Step V ′ under E and E ′ are the same.
Before Step V ′ under E ′, the cycles S1, . . . , SV
′−1 have occurred. Before Step V ′ under E,
the cycles S1, . . . , SV
′−1, C(i, E) have occurred. Since each object a ∈ ⋃s∈C(i,E) Ωs has only
been assigned once (at Step V under E), each such a is attainable given xV
′−1 under E. Since
C(i, E) comprises the only diﬀerence between xV
′−1 under E and E ′, the set of attainable
objects at Step V ′ under E and E ′ are the same.
Step 3: Each s ∈ QV ′+1 occurs at V ′+ 2 under E. Since the set of attainable objects
given xV
′−1 under E and E ′ are the same, at Step V ′ under E and E ′, each j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+1 s
points to the same object. As argued before, UV
′ 6= ∅ implies there is an agent in UV ′ who is
the earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V ′ under E. This means, for each s ∈ SV ′ , each
h ∈ s points to an object a s.t. there is h′ ∈ s with a = Ωh′ . Hence, at Step V ′+ 1 under E,
each b ∈ ⋃s∈SV ′ ⋃h∈s Ωh is still attainable given xV ′ under E. Since each j′ ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+1 s is
assigned an object in the set
⋃
s∈QV ′
⋃
h∈s Ωh, each j
′ points to an agent who is not in SV
′
at
Step V ′ under E. Then, at Step V ′ under E either j′ points to ϕj′(E) or an agent in UV
′
.
There is at least one h ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+1 s s.t. h points to an agent in UV ′ at Step V ′ under E,
otherwise QV
′+1 occurs at Step V ′ under E.
Without loss of generality, let h be such an agent, a ∈ ⋃j∈UV ′ Ωj, and ja be the owner of
a. Since ja has not been assigned an object, a has not been assigned to any agent. There is
a transfer process in which each agent in C(ja, E) transfers to the next agent in C(ja, E) in
the ﬁrst round. Then, a is still attainable given xV
′
under E: ja transfers to another agent
in the second round. Hence, if h points to a at Step V ′ under E, then h still points to a
at Step V ′ + 1 under E. By deﬁnition of QV
′
+ 1, there is h′ ∈ NV ′+1 s.t. h is assigned
Ωh′ . Since j
a /∈ NV ′+1, this is a contradiction. Hence, at Step V ′ under E, h points to an
object a /∈ ⋃j∈UV ′ Ωj, and a points to an agent in UV ′ . Recall there is u ∈ UV ′ s.t. u is the
earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V ′ under E, and by deﬁnition of UV
′
, Ωi is assigned
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to some agent. In C(u,E), since Ωi points to u, and Ωi is the only object which does not
point to its owner, at Step V ′ under E, h must point to Ωi.22
Since no agent in
⋃
s∈SV ′ s points to Ωi at Step V
′ under E and E ′, Ωi is attainable
given xV
′
under E ′. As shown above, at Step V ′ under E, h points to Ωi. Since the set of
attainable objects at Step V ′ + 1 under E ′ is the same as the set of attainable objects at
Step V ′ under E, at Step V ′ + 1 under E ′, h points to Ωi. Since UV
′ 6= ∅, at Step V ′ + 1
under E ′, Ωi points to an agent in UV
′
, and h is not assigned.
At Step V ′ under E and E ′, each j ∈ {⋃s∈QV ′+1 s}\h points to ϕj(E). Furthermore, at
Step V ′ under E ′, there is j ∈ {⋃s∈QV ′+1 s}\h which points to h. Since h is not assigned at
Step V ′+ 1 under E ′, each agent in
⋃
s∈QV ′+1 s is a remaining agent at Step V
′+ 2 under E ′.
At Step V ′ + 2 under E ′, the same set of cycles S1, . . . , SV
′
, C(i, E), UV
′
have occurred
under E and E ′, implying xV
′
under E and xV
′+1 under E ′ are the same. Hence, at Step
V ′ + 2 under E ′, each j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+1 s points to the same object a which j points to at
Step V ′ + 1 under E. Then cycles QV
′+1 occurs at Step V ′ + 2 under E ′, and for each
j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+1 s, ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E).
Step 4: T V
′+1 occurs at Step V ′ + 2 under E ′. Since the set of attainable objects
given xV
′−1 under E and E ′ are the same, at Step V ′ under E and E ′, each j ∈ T V ′+1 points
to the same object.
Without loss of generality, let h ∈ T V ′+1 be such that at Step V ′ under E, h points to
an agent in SV
′
or UV
′
. Such an h exists, otherwise T V
′+1 may occur at a step under E
before T V
′+1. Since the set of attainable objects given xV
′−1 under E and E ′ is the same,
h points to the same object at Step V ′ under E and E ′. The only diﬀerence from Step 4 is
that h ∈ T V ′+1 can point to an agent in SV ′ .
Case 1: At Step V ′ under E, h points to an agent in SV
′
. Then SV
′
occurs at
Step V ′ under E ′, and h is not assigned an object. Since at V ′ + 1 under E ′, UV
′
is the
only cycle, h is not assigned at this step either. At Step V ′ + 2 under E ′, the same set of
cycles S1, . . . , SV
′
, UV
′
, C(i, E) have occurred as in Step V ′ + 1 under E. Hence, the set of
attainable objects given xV
′+1 under E ′ and xV
′
under E is the same. So each j ∈ T V ′+1
points to the same at Step V ′ + 2 under E ′ and Step V ′ + 1 under ET V
′+1 occurs at Step
V ′ + 2 under E ′.
Case 2: At Step V ′ under E, h points to an agent in UV
′
. Then since UV
′
does
not occur until Step V ′ + 1 under E ′, h is a remaining agent at Step V ′ + 2 under E ′.
As before xV
′
under E and xV
′+1 under E ′ are the same, each agent j ∈ T V ′+1 points to
the same object at Step V ′ + 2 under E ′ and V ′ + 1 under E. Then, T V
′+1 occurs at Step
V ′ + 2 under E ′, and for each j ∈ T V ′+1, ϕj(E ′) = ϕj(E). 
22This further implies at Step V ′ + 1, Ωi is not attainable. The only time this is possible is the following
situation. Let 1 be the owner of a = ϕi(E). Then 1 transfers a to 2, 3, i; 2 transfers b to 4, 5, 6; and 3
transfers c to 7, 8, 9. Since i must help 1 transfer a, only two agents may receive object Ωi.
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Step E E ′
1 S1 S1
...
...
...
V SV UV = C(i, E) SV
...
...
...
...
V ′ SV
′
UV
′
SV
′
UV = C(i, E)
V ′ + 1 QV
′+1 T V
′+1 UV
′
V ′ + 2 QV
′+1 T V
′+1
Figure 4: Cycles QV
′+1 and T V
′+1 occur at Step V ′+1 under E, but under E′, when UV ′ 6= ∅,
they occur at Step V ′ + 2.
Claim 4 For each k ∈ {1 . . . , k¯(E) − V ′}, and each j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+k∪TV ′+1 s, ϕj(E ′) =
ϕj(E).
Proof: We have proved the statement for k = 1 above, and proceed by induction. Let
the statement be true for k = 2, . . . , k − 1. If QV ′+k = T V ′+k = ∅, then the algorithm has
terminated and we are done. If QV
′+k = ∅ and T V ′+k 6= ∅, then proceed to Step 4 of the
proof.
Let QV
′+k 6= ∅.
Step 1: T V
′+k−1 6= ∅. Suppose by contradiction, T V ′+k−1 = ∅. By deﬁnition of QV ′+k−1,
for each s ∈ QV ′+k−1, and each h ∈ s, ϕh(E) ∈
⋃
t∈C(h,E) Ωt. Let h
a be the agent assigned
a at Step V ′ + k − 1 under E. For each a ∈ ⋃t∈C(h,E) Ωt, there is a transfer process and
h′ ∈ N\s which assigns to h′ object a: in R1, the owner of a replicates and transfers to
ha, and in R2, to h′. Since each object b attainable given xV
′+k−2 under E which is not in⋃
t∈C(h,E) Ωt is not assigned to a new agent, b is still attainable given x
V ′+k−1 under E. Hence,
each object which is attainable given xV
′+k−2 under E is attainable given xV
′+k−1 under E.
At Step V ′+k under E, each agent in NV
′+k points to the same object as the previous Step,
but since s′ ∈ QV ′+k is a cycle, s′ must have happened at Step V ′ + k − 1violating the
deﬁnition of the rule.
Step 2: Each j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+k s , j is a remaining agent at Step V ′+k under E ′, and each
cycle s ∈ QV ′+k eventually occurs under E ′. For each s ∈ QV ′+k, there is h ∈ s s.t. at
Steps 1, . . . , V ′+k−1 under E, h points to an agent g /∈ C(h,E); otherwise, the cycle C(h,E)
forms before Step V ′ + k under E. At Steps 1, . . . , V − 1 under E and E ′, the algorithm
is the same, so h ∈ NV implies h is a remaining agent at Step V under E ′. Furthermore,
since xV−1 under E and E ′ is the same, h points to the same object at Step V under E and
E ′. Let G ≡ {C(i, E), SV , . . . , SV ′ , UV ′ , QV ′+1, . . . , QV ′+k−1, T V ′+1, . . . , T V ′+k−1} be the set
of all cycles which occur during Steps V, . . . , V ′ + k − 1 under E.
For each t ∈ {0, . . . , V ′ − V }, and each Step V + t under E, h points to an agent
in
⋃
g∈G
⋃
s∈g s. Case 1: At Step V under E, h points to an agent in C(i, E). Then,
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at Steps V, . . . , V ′ under E ′, h points to the same agent. Case 2: There are sequences
g1, . . . , gz ∈ {0, . . . , V ′ − V }, and f1, . . . , fz ∈ N s.t.
• g1 < · · · < gz,
• gz = V ′ − V ,
• for each m ∈ {1, . . . , z}, fm ∈
⋃
s∈Sgm∪UV ′ s,
• h points to f1 at Steps V, . . . , V + g1 under E, and
• for each m ∈ {2, . . . , z}, h points to fm at Steps V + gy−1 + 1, . . . , V + gy under E.
Since h points to the same object at Step V under E and E ′, and the set of remaining agents
at Step V under E and E ′ is the same, h points to f1 at Step V under E ′. We will show h
is a remaining agent at Step V ′ under E ′.
If f1 ∈ C(i, E), then at Steps V, . . . , V ′ under E ′, h points to f1.
If there is m ∈ {1, . . . , z} s.t. at Steps V + gm−1 + 1, . . . , V + gm under E, fm is the
earliest-priority remaining agent and h points to a ∈ ⋃s∈C(i,E) Ωs (which points to fm), then
h points to an agent in C(i, E) at Step V ′ under E ′.
Let A ≡ ⋃k∈{1,...,V−1}⋃s∈Sk s. If there ism ∈ {1, . . . , z} s.t. at Steps V +gm−1, . . . , V +gm
under E, fm is the earliest- priority remaining agent, h points to a ∈
⋃
s∈C(i,E)∪A Ωs, and there
is j ∈ C(i, E) s.t. j is the earliest-priority remaining agent in the set NV+gm−1+1∪ j, then at
Steps V, . . . , V + gm−1 − 1 under E ′, h points to the same sequence of agents f1, . . . , fm−1,
and at Steps V + gm−1, . . . , V ′ under E ′, h points to j.
If the previous cases do not hold, then h points to the same sequence of agents f1, . . . , fz
at Steps V, . . . , V ′ under E and E ′. In all cases, h is a remaining agent at Step V ′ under E ′.
Next, we show h is a remaining agent at Step V ′ + k under E ′.
If UV
′
= ∅, then the same set of cycles QV ′ , T V ′ , QV ′+1, T V ′+1, . . . , QV ′+k−1, T V ′+k−1 occur
at Steps V ′, . . . , V ′ + k − 1 under E and E ′. Hence, we can construct a sequence as above,
and h points to the same sequence of agents at Steps V ′, . . . , V ′+ k− 1. So h is a remaining
agent at Step V ′ + k under E.
If UV
′ 6= ∅, then as shown previously, the set of attainable objects given xV ′−1 under E
and xV
′−1 under E ′ is the same and h points to the same object at Step V ′ under E and E ′.
Let u ∈ UV ′ , and j ∈ u be s.t. j is the earliest-priority remaining agent. This means j is
the earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V ′ under E: NV \{C(i, E)∪{⋃s∈SV ,...,SV ′−1 s}}.
At Step V ′ under E ′, the set of remaining agents is NV \{⋃s∈SV ,...,SV ′−1 s}. Hence, at Step
V ′ under E ′, either j is the earliest-priority remaining agent, or there is j′ ∈ C(i, E) s.t. j′
is earlier w.r.t σ.
At Step V ′ under E, h either points to an agent in SV
′
or UV
′
. If h points to an agent in
SV
′
, then he is a remaining agent at Step V ′ under E ′. If h points to an object a which points
to an agent in UV
′
, then at Step V ′ under E ′, there is either j ∈ ⋃s∈UV ′ s or j′ ∈ C(i, E) s.t.
j or j′ is the earliest-priority remaining agent. If a /∈ ⋃s∈C(i,E) Ωs and j is the earliest, then
UV
′
occurs at Step V ′ + 1 under E ′; so h still points to j at Step V ′ and V ′ + 1 under E ′.
If a ∈ ⋃s∈C(i,E) Ωs or j′ is the earliest , then h points to j′ at Step V ′ under E ′, and since
C(i, E) occurs at Step V ′ under E ′, h is not assigned an object. Furthermore, at V ′ + 1
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under E ′, in either case, h points to an agent in UV
′
. Since UV
′
occurs at Step V ′+ 1 under
E ′, h is not assigned at V ′ + 1 under E ′.
If UV
′
= ∅, then let D(V ′ + 1) = V ′ + 1. If UV ′ 6= ∅, then let D(V ′ + 1) = V ′ + 2.
For each z ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, let D(V ′ + z) be the step at which QV ′+z and T V ′+z cycles
occurs under E ′ (by assumption this is true). Let z ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}. Before Step D(V ′+ z)
under E ′ and Step V ′ + z under E, the same cycles H ≡ {S1, . . . , SV ′ , C(i, E), UV ′ , QV ′+1,
. . . , QV
′+z−1, T V
′
, . . . , T V
′+z−1} have occurred. This implies xD(V ′+z−1) under E ′ and xV ′+z−1
under E are the same, implying at Step D(V ′ + z) under E ′ and Step V ′ + z under E, h
points to the same agent. Since at Step V ′+z under E, h is not in a cycle, at Step D(V ′+z)
under E ′, h is not in a cycle either.
Hence, h is a remaining agent at Step D(V ′ + k − 1) + 1 under E ′, and h points to
the same agent as in Step V ′ + k under E. Under analagous reasoning as for h, for each
j ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+k s, j is a remaining agent at Step D(V ′ + k − 1) + 1 under E ′, and j points to
the same agent as in Step V ′ + k under E. Since QV
′+k cycles occur at Step V ′ + k under
E, QV
′+k cycles occur at Step D(V ′ + k − 1) + 1 under E ′.
Step 3: T V
′+k occurs at Step D(V ′+k−1)+1 under E ′. If T V ′+k = ∅, then we are done.
Let T V
′+k 6= ∅. As before, there is h ∈ ⋃s∈TV ′+k s s.t. at Steps 1, . . . , V ′ + k − 1 under E, h
does not point to any agent in C(h,E). The same reasoning holds as if h ∈ ⋃s∈QV ′+k s. This
implies (as shown above) each j ∈ ⋃s∈TV ′+k s is a remaining agent at Step D(V ′+ k− 1) + 1
under E ′. The same cycles H have occurred before Step D(V ′+k−1)+1 under E ′ and V ′+k
under E. This means the set of remaining agents at these two steps are the same, implying
the earliest-priority remaining agent is the same. Also as above, each j ∈ ⋃s∈TV ′+k s points
to the same object at Step D(V ′ + k − 1) + 1 under E ′ and Step V ′ + k under E. The two
previous statements imply cycles T V
′+k occur at Step D(V ′ + k − 1) + 1 under E ′. 
1.1 Withholding-proofness
Let Q be the ﬁrst step under E that there is j ∈ N which points to Ωi, E ′ ≡ (R,Ωi = ∅,Ω−i),
and V ′ be the step under E ′ at which i is assigned an object.
Case 1: Q > V . Steps 1, . . . , V under E and E ′ are the same, so ϕi(E) = ϕi(E ′).
Case 2: Q = V . Steps 1, . . . , V − 1 under E and E ′ are the same, so at Step V under
E and E ′, the set of attainable objects are the same, and i points to the same object. If
V ′ = V , then ϕi(E) = ϕi(E ′). Let V ′ > V . For each k ∈ {V − 1, . . . , V ′ − 1}, and each
j ∈ N s.t. xV−1j under E is not ∅, xkj under E ′ is the same as xV−1j under E. By Lemma 1,
the set of attainable objects given xV
′−1 under E is contained in the set of attainable objects
given xV−1 under E. Hence, i points to his most preferred object in a smaller set at Step V ′
under E ′, implying ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E ′).
Case 3: Q < V .
Step 1: If i is assigned an object at Step V ≤ V ′, then ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E ′). For each
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , V − 1−Q}, let
• Jk ≡ {j ∈ N : at Step Q+ k under E, j points to i},
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• Sk ≡ {s ⊆ 2N : s is a cycle s1, . . . , sz at Step Q+ k under E},
• T k ≡ {t ⊆ 2N\{J0∪···∪Jk} : t is a cycle t1, . . . , tz at Step Q+ k under E ′}, and
• Uk ≡ {t ⊆ 2N : t is a cycle at Step Q + k under E ′, and there is j ∈ {J0 ∪ · · · ∪ Jk}
s.t. j ∈ t}.
Step E E ′
Q S0 T 0 U0
Q+ 1 S1 T 1 U1
...
...
...
...
V ′ SV
′−Q T V
′−Q UV
′−Q
Figure 5: At Step Q + k under E the set of all cycles is Sk. At Step Q + k under E′, the set
of cycles divided into two groups: T k is group unaﬀected by the fact that i has withheld, and Uk
is the group aﬀected by the fact that i has withheld (because there is some agent who pointed at
Ωi).
Claim For each k ∈ {0, . . . , V − 1−Q}, Sk = T k.
Proof: Steps 1, . . . , Q − 1 under E and E ′ are the same, implying the set of attainable
objects at Step Q under E and E ′ are the same, and the earliest-priority remaining agent
at Step Q under E and E ′ is the same. Hence, each j ∈ NQ\J0 points to the same agent
j′ ∈ NQ\J0, and S0 = T 0.
By deﬁnition, for each u ∈ U0, there is ` ∈ J0 s.t. ` ∈ u. At Step Q + 1 under E, `
points to Ωi, implying that the earliest step ` can be in a cycle is V . Hence, ` /∈
⋃
s∈S1 s. Let
j ∈ ⋃s∈S1 s. At Step Q+ 1 under E, if j points to an agent in ⋃s∈U0 s, then he will remain
until at least Step V under Ea contradiction. So {⋃s∈S1 s}⋂{⋃s∈U0 s} = ∅.
Next we show for each s ∈ S1, and each j ∈ s, j points to the same object at Steps
Q + 1 under E and E ′. The only diﬀerence between xQ under E and E ′ is the assignment
of agents in the set of cycles U0. At Step Q under E ′, if each h ∈ ⋃s∈U0 s points to object
in
⋃
s∈U0
⋃
g∈s Ωg, then the set of attainable objects given x
Q under E and E ′ are the same
and j points to the same object at Step Q + 1 under E and E ′implying S1 = T 1. If
instead, there is h ∈ ⋃s∈U0 s s.t. h is assigned a /∈ ⋃s∈U0 ⋃g∈s Ωg, then there is h′ ∈ ⋃s∈U0 s
s.t. h′ is the earliest-priority remaining agent in the set NQ, and consequently the set
NQ\⋃s∈S0 s. This implies h′ is the earliest-priority remaing agent at Step Q + 1 under E.
Since {⋃s∈S1 s}⋂{⋃s∈U0 s} = ∅, for each s ∈ S1, and each j ∈ s, at Step Q+1 under E, the
only object which points to j is Ωj. Hence, at Step Q+ 1 under E, each j ∈
⋃
s∈S1 s points
to object aj ∈ ⋃g∈s Ωg. Since the set of attainable objects at Step Q + 1 under E contains
the set of attainable objects at Step Q + 1 under E ′, the fact that for each j ∈ ⋃s∈S1 s, at
Step Q + 1 under E, j points to aj implies at Step Q + 1 under E ′, j points to aj. This
implies each s ∈ S1 occurs at Step Q+ 1 under E ′, and S1 = T 1.
The rest of the proof is completed by iteration of the previous reasoning for S2, . . . , SV−1.
The following is a demonstration for S2 = T 2.
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Let j ∈ ⋃s∈S2 s, and a be the object j points to at Step Q + 2 under E, and b be the
object j points to at Step Q + 2 under E ′. The only diﬀerence between xQ+1 under E and
E ′ is the assignment of agents in the set of cycles U0and U1.
If for each m ∈ {0, 1}, each s ∈ Um, and each h ∈ s, at Step Q + m under E ′, h points
to object in
⋃
g∈s Ωs, then the set of attainable objects given x
Q+1 under E and E ′ are the
same, and a = b.
If there is h ∈ ⋃s∈U0 s s.t. h is assigned d /∈ ⋃s∈U0 ⋃g∈s Ωg, then there is h′ ∈ ⋃s∈U0 s
s.t. h′ is the earliest-priority remaining agent in the set NQ. Since h′ remains at least until
Step V under E, h′ is still the earliest-priority remaining agent at Steps Q + 1 and Q + 2
under E. Similarly as before, {⋃s∈S2 s}⋂{⋃s∈U0 s} = ∅. Hence, for each s ∈ S2, and each
j ∈ s, at Step Q + 2 under E, the only object which points to j is Ωj. This implies that at
Step Q + 2 under E, for each s ∈ S2 and each j ∈ s, j points to an object aj ∈ ⋃g∈s Ωg.
Since the set of attainable objects given xQ+1 under E contains the set of attainable objects
given xQ+1 under E ′, but each aj ∈ ⋃g∈s Ωg is still attainable given xQ+1 under E ′, for each
s ∈ S2, and each j ∈ s , j points to aj at Step Q+ 2 under E ′. Meaning a = b.
If there is h ∈ ⋃s∈U1 s s.t. h is assigned d /∈ ⋃s∈U1 ⋃j∈s Ωj, then there is h′ ∈ ⋃s∈U0 s s.t.
h′ is the earliest-priority remaining agent in the set NQ+1. The reasoning of above holds. 
For each i ∈ N s.t. xV−1i under E is not ∅, either
1. i was assigned in {1, . . . , Q− 1}, implying xV−1i under E ′ and E are the same; or,
2. i ∈ ⋃k∈{0,...,V−1−Q}⋃s∈Sk s = ⋃k∈{0,...,V−1−Q}⋃t∈Tk t, implying xV−1i under E ′ and E
are the same.
By Lemma 1, the set of attainable objects given xV−1 under E contains the set of attainable
objects given xV−1 under E ′. Since i points to his most preferred object from the former set,
ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E
′). We have completed Step 1.
Now we need to show that ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E
′) when V > V ′. For intuition, we give the proof
of the case when V ′ = Q+ 1.
Claim If V ′ = Q+ 1, then ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E ′).
Proof: If V ≤ V ′, then by Step 1, we are done. Let V > V ′. Since U0 is the only
additional assignment made in xQ under E ′ compared to xQ under E, by Lemma 1, the set
of attainable objects at Step Q + 1 under E contains the set of attainable objects at Step
Q+ 1 under E ′. Let a be the object i points to at Step Q+ 1 under E.
Case 1: a 6= ϕi(E ′). Since U0 is the only additional set of cycles occuring before Step
Q+ 1 under E ′ compared to Step Q+ 1 under E, U0 must have caused the unattainability
of a after Step Q under E ′. The two ways that a becomes unattainable are demonstrated in
Figure 6.
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Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
j
a−→ 1 j a−→ 2 1 b−→ j 1 b−→ 2
1
a−→ 3 ja b−→ 3
ja
a−→ 4 4 a−→ 5
2
c−→ 6 2 c−→ 7
6
c−→ 8
3
d−→ 9 3 d−→ 10
9
d−→ 11
Figure 6: Let ja be the owner of a. On the left, a may be unattainable because in xQ under
E′, three agents are assigned object a. On the right, since three agents are assigned Ω2 = c, 2 must
transfer in R1 and R2; similarly so for 3. This implies j must help 1 transfer b to 3 in R2; which
further implies j may not transfer a in R2. Hence, only two agents receive a in xQ under E′, and a
is unattainable.
This means there is u ∈ U0, and uz ∈ u such that at Step Q under E ′ 1) uz is the
earliest-priority remaining agent, and 2) a points to uz.
23 Furthermore, by deﬁnition of
u ∈ U0, there is uz−1, . . . , u1 ∈ u such that at Step Q under E ′, uz points to uz−2 points to...
u1, and u1 ∈ J0. Hence, at Step Q under E, a points to uz points to uz−1 points to... u1
points to Ωi. At Step Q + 1 under E, each of these objects/agents still points in the same
fashion. Since at Step Q+ 1 under E, i points to a, i is in a cycle. This contradicts the fact
that V > V ′ = Q+ 1.
Case 2: a = ϕi(E
′). At Step Q + 1 under E ′, the fact that Ω′i = ∅ and i is in a
cycle implies that i is the earliest-priority remaining agent. That is, i is earliest in the set
NQ\{⋃s∈U0∪T 0 s}. This implies, at Step Q + 1 under E, either i or an agent in ⋃s∈U0 s is
the earliest-priority remaining agent.
Subcase 2.1: At StepQ+1 under E, an agent in
⋃
s∈U0 s is the earliest-priority remaining
agent. Let uz ∈ u be this agent.
Subcase 2.1.1: At Step Q+1 under E, ja is not a remaining agent. Then at Step Q+1
under E, a points to uz. By the reasoning of Case 1, i is in a cycle at Step Q+ 1 under E.
Subcase 2.1.2: At Step Q+ 1 under E, ja is a remaining agent. At Step Q under E ′, if
ja points to an agent in
⋃
s∈U0 s, then there is u ∈ U0, and uy, . . . , u1 ∈ u such that a points
to ja points to uy points to uy−1 points to... u1, and u1 ∈ J0. By the reasoning of Case 1, i
is in a cycle at Step Q + 1 under E. At Step Q under E ′, if ja points to either an agent in⋃
s∈T 0 s or ϕja(E
′), then let b be the object ja points to at Step Q+ 1 under E.
Subcase 2.1.2.1: b 6= ϕja(E ′). Since b is unattainable, by the reasoning in Case 1, at
Step Q under E, b points to uz. Furthermore, there is u ∈ U0 and uz−1, . . . , u1 ∈ u such that
at Step Q+ 1 under E, a points to ja points to b points to uz points to uz−1 points to... u1
points to Ωi points to i points to a. Then, i is in a cycle at Step Q+ 1 under E.
23Although a points to uz, it is not necessarily the case that a is in a cycle at Step Q under E
′. For
example, consider the latter situation in Figure 6. Let xQ−1 under E′ be such that each agent each agent
except 11 in that transfer process is assigned his respective object. Then, a and d are still attainable given
xQ−1 under E′. At Step Q under E′, if d is in a cycle, then as the transfer process shows, at Step Q + 1
under E′, a is not attainable.
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Subcase 2.1.2.2: b = ϕja(E
′). At Step Q + 1 under E ′, since i is the earliest-priority
remaining agent, b either points to i or an agent jb ∈ c(i, E ′) where Ωjb = b. If b points to
i, then by deﬁnition of Case 2.1, at Step Q+ 1 under E, b points to uz and the reasoning of
Case 1 holds. If b points to jb, then we consider what jb points to at Step Q under E ′ and
follow the reasoning of Subcase 2.1.2, replacing ja with jb. Since c(i, E ′) is ﬁnite, there is
eventually an agent j which points to i, and we are done.
Subcase 2.2: At Step Q+1 under E, i is the earliest-priority remaining agent. Replacing
uz with i, the reasoning of Case 2.1 holds. 
The proof for the general case involves a straightforward generalization of the proof for
the case where V ′ = Q+ 1. Now instead of just U0 causing unattainability of a, a sequence
of sets of cycles U0, U1, . . . , Uk causes the unattainability of a.
Step 2: ϕi(E)Ri ϕi(E
′). If V ≤ V ′, then by Step 1, we are done. Let V > V ′. Let a be
the object i points to at Step V ′ under E.
Case 1: a 6= ϕi(E ′).
Subcase 1.1: At Step V ′ under E, ja is not a remaining agent.
By Lemma 1 and Step 1, the set of attainable objects at Step V ′ under E contains the
set of attainable objects at Step V ′ under E ′. Since U0, . . . , UV
′−Q−1 are the only extra
cycles in xV
′−Q−1 under E ′ compared to xV
′−Q−1 under E, these cycles must have caused
the unattainability of a at some step under E ′. That is, there is a g ∈ N such that at
Step Q + g under E ′, a is attainable, but at Step Q + g + 1 under E ′, a is not attainable.
Let h ∈ U g be the earliest-priority remaining agent at Step g under E ′; equivalently, h is
the earliest-priority remaining agent in the set NQ\{⋃s∈T 0,...,T g−1,U0,...,Ug−1} s}. This implies
that either h or an agent in
⋃
s∈U0,...,Ug−1 s is the earliest-priority remaining agent in the set
NQ\{⋃s∈T 0,...,T g−1 s}which is the set of remaining agents at Step Q + g under E. Let hz
be this agent. By deﬁnition, only the cycles S0, . . . , SV
′−1 occur at Steps Q, . . . , V ′−1 under
E; hence, hz is the earliest-priority remaining agent at Steps Q + g, . . . , V
′ under E. Let
g¯ ∈ {0, . . . , g} be such that Step Q+ g¯ under E is the ﬁrst Step under E at which hz is the
earliest-priority remaining agent.
For each k ∈ {0, . . . , g¯ − 1}, at Step Q + k under E, if the earliest-priority remaining
agent j is in the set
⋃
s∈U0,...,Ug s, then j is the earliest-priority remaining agent at Steps
Q + k, . . . , V ′ under E. Since we have established hz 6= j is the earliest-priority remaining
agent at Step V ′ under E, this is not possible. Hence, for each k ∈ {0, . . . , g¯ − 1}, the
earliest-priority remaining agent at Step Q + k under E is in the set
⋃
s∈T 0,...,T g¯−1 s. This
implies for each k ∈ {0, . . . , g¯ − 1}, at Steps Q + k under E and E ′, the earliest-priority
remaining agent is the same.
Next, we construct a sequence of agents hz−1, . . . , h1. For Steps Q, . . . , Q + g under E ′,
hz points to a sequence of agents (Figure 7).
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Step under E ′
Q T 0 U gz U0
Q+ 1 T 2 U gz T 1
Q+ 2 T 2 U gz T 2
Q+ 3 U3 U gz T 3
...
...
...
...
Q+ gz U
gz U gz U gz
Figure 7: Several possible sequences of agents at which hz points to are shown. In the ﬁrst
column, at Step Q under E′, hz points to an agent in
⋃
s∈T 0 s. The ﬁrst Step under E
′ at which
hz points to an agent in a U  cycle is Step Q + 3. Hence, if the conditions 1.a and 1.b hold, then
hz−1 is this agent, and gz−1 = 3.
Let gˆ ∈ {0, . . . , g} be such that Step Q+ gˆ under E ′ is the ﬁrst Step under E ′ that either
1. for each Step Q, . . . , Q+ gˆ − 1 under E ′,
(a) hz points to an agent in
⋃
s∈T 0,...,T gˆ−1 s,
(b) hz does not point to an object in
⋃
s∈U0,...,U gˆ−1 Ωs, and
at Step Q+ gˆ under E ′, hz points to an agent in
⋃
s∈U gˆ s, OR
2. for each Step Q, . . . , Q+ gˆ under E ′,
(a) hz points to an agent in
⋃
s∈T 0,...,T gˆ s, and
(b) at Step Q+ gˆ under E ′, hz points to an object in
⋃
s∈U0,...,U gˆ−1 Ωs.
Such a gˆ exists; let gz−1 = gˆ. If gˆ satisﬁes the former condition, then let hz−1 ∈
⋃
s∈U gˆ s be
the agent that hz points to at Step gˆ under E
′. If the gˆ satisﬁes the latter condition, then
let hz−1 ∈
⋃
s∈U0,...,U gˆ s be the owner of the object hz points to at Step Q+ gˆ under E
′.
By construction, at Step Q + gz−1 under E, hz points to hz−1. Repeat this process for
hz−1 to ﬁnd hz−2, and so forth, until we arrive at the ﬁrst hz−x who is in
⋃
s∈U0 s.
We show no agent appears twice in this sequence. Suppose by contradiction, there is a
consecutive subsequence hk, hk−1, . . . , hk−x such that hk = hk−x. This is only possible if each
hk, . . . , hk−x iteratively satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition, implying gk = gk−1 = · · · = gk−x = gk.
Then, at Step Q+ gk under E, hk, . . . , hk−x forms a cycle. Since each of these agents is not
in
⋃
s∈T gk s, this is a contradiction. By ﬁniteness of the number of agents, we arrive at hz−x
who is in
⋃
s∈U0 s.
Consider hz−x. By deﬁnition of U0, hz−x points to an agent in
⋃
s∈U0 s. Let hz−x−1 be this
agent. If hz−x−1 ∈ J0, then we have reached the end of the sequence. Redeﬁne z and relabel
agents so that hz−x−1 = h1. If hz−x−1 /∈ J0, then repeat this process. By the deﬁnition of U0
and ﬁniteness of cycles, we eventually reach an agent h ∈ J0. Redeﬁne z and relabel agents
so that this agent is h1.
By construction, for each k ∈ {0, . . . , z}, at Step Q + gk under E, hk+1 points to hk.
Hence, we have a sequence of agents hz, . . . , h1 such that at Step gz−1 under E, hz points to
hz−1 points to... h1 (Figure 8). Since hz is the earliest-priority remaining agent at Step V ′
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under E and ja is not remaining, a points to hz points to hz−1 points to... h1 points to Ωi
points to i points to a, and i is in a cycle. This contradicts the assumption that a 6= ϕi(E ′).
We have completed Subcase 1.1.
Step under E
Q+ g1 h2 → h1 → Ωi → i
...
Q+ g2 h3 → h2 → h1 → Ωi → i
...
Q+ gz−2 hz−1 → hz−2 . . . h3 → h2 → h1 → Ωi → i
...
Q+ gz−1 hz → hz−1 → hz−2 . . . h3 → h2 → h1 → Ωi → i
Figure 8: By construction, at each Step in E before Step Q + gz−1, hz only points to agents
in who are in cycles (
⋃
s∈T 0,...,T gz−1−1 s). So Step Q + gz−1 under E is the ﬁrst Step at which he
points to an agent, hz−1, not in a cycle. We repeat this argument for hz−1, . . . , h1 until we ﬁnd h1
points to Ωi. Hence, at Step Q + gz−1 under E, hz points to hz−1 points to... h1. The agents still
point in this fashion until Step V ′ under E.
Subcase 1.2: At Step V ′ under E, ja is a remaining agent. Then, at Step V ′
under E ′, ja is in a cycle with i. Let hz = ja. Then, construct hz−1, . . . , h1 as in Subcase
1.1 (the sequence obtained may be diﬀerent). The reasoning of Subcase 1.1 holds, implying
at Step V ′ under E, a points to ja points to hz−1 points to... h1 points to Ωi points to i.
The proof for Step 2, and thereby withholding-proofness, is complete. 
Appendix 2
In sections 2.1-2.4, we show that the properties are independent. In section 2.5, we deﬁne a
rule outside of the TTC − SIσ family satisfying the four properties.
2.1
For each E ∈ E , and each i ∈ N , let ϕi(E) = ∅. Then, ϕ satisﬁes group strategy-proofness,
reciprocity lower bound, and withholding-proofness, but not eﬃciency.
2.2
Let R¯i ( Ri, and σ ∈ Σ. Let pi be a permutation of N s.t. pi(1) = i, for each k ∈
{2, . . . , σ−1(i)}, pi(k) = σ(k − 1), and for each k ∈ {σ−1(i) + 1, . . . , n}, pi(k) = σ(k). Let pi′
be a permutation of N s.t. pi(n) = i, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , σ−1(i)}, pi(k) = σ(k), and for each
k ∈ {σ−1(i) + 1, . . . , n}, pi(k) = σ(k − 1).
For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , and each σ ∈ Σ, let
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ϕσ(E) ≡
{
TTC − SIpi(E) if Ri ∈ R¯i
TTC − SIpi′(E) if Ri ∈ Ri\R¯i
Then, ϕσ satisﬁes withholding-proofness, the reciprocity lower bound, and eﬃciency, but
not group strategy-proofness. It is straightforward to construct an economy E where i has
incentive to misreport.
2.3
Let Eˆ be the set of E = (R, Ωˆ) ∈ E s.t.
• N = {1, . . . , 5},
• Ωˆ = (a, b, c, d, e),
• for each z ∈ O\{e}, eR1 z, and
• for each i ∈ N\1, and each z ∈ O\{a}, aRi z.
Let σ(i) = i, and for each E ∈ E , let R5(2) be 5's second-ranked object w.r.t. R5 and
ϕ(E) ≡
{
(e, a, a, a, R5(2)) if E ∈ Eˆ
TTC − SIσ(E) if E ∈ E\Eˆ
Then, for each E ∈ Eˆ , ϕ1(E) = Ω5, and Ω1 = aP5 e = ϕ5(E), in violation of the
reciprocity lower bound. It is clear that the rule satisﬁes eﬃciency and withholding-proofness.
Claim ϕ satisﬁes group strategy-proofness.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that there is E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , S ⊆ N , and R′S ∈ RS such
that for each i ∈ S, ϕi(R′S, R−S,Ω)Ri ϕi(E), and for some j ∈ S, ϕj(R′S, R−S,Ω)Pj ϕ(E).
Let E ′ = (R′S, R−S,Ω).
Case 1: E = (R,Ω) ∈ Eˆ . If E ′ ∈ Eˆ , then ϕ(E ′) = ϕ(E), so let E ′ ∈ E\Eˆ . For
each i ∈ N\5, ϕi(E) = arg maxRi, so 1) for each i ∈ S\{5}, ϕi(E) = ϕi(E ′), and 2)
5 ∈ S and ϕ5(E ′) = aP5 ϕ5(E). First, {2, 3, 4} ⊂ S is not true, otherwise, by assumption
ϕ2(E
′) = ϕ3(E ′) = ϕ4(E ′) = a, so ϕ5(E ′) = a is not possible. Hence, there is j ∈ {2, 3, 4}
such that j /∈ S. If each i ∈ S top-ranks Ωj, then there is some agent h in S such that
ϕh(E)Ph ϕh(E
′) = Ωj. If not every agent in S top-ranks Ωj, then the unique eﬃcient
allocation for E ′ is the one where each agent is assigned his top-ranked object in (R′S, R−S).
Since E ′ ∈ E\Eˆ , there is i ∈ S such that the top-ranked object in Ri and R′i is not the
same. If i 6= 5, then this violates ϕi(E) = ϕi(E ′); if i = 5, then i does not top-rank a, and
ϕ5(E
′) 6= aviolating the assumption that 5 strictly beneﬁts.
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Case 2: E = (R,Ω) ∈ E\Eˆ . If E ′ ∈ E\Eˆ , then since TTC − SIσ is group-strategy-
proof, existence of such a coalition S is not possible. Let E ′ ∈ Eˆ . If there is a unique
eﬃcient allocation, then each agent is assigned their top-ranked object and manipulation is
impossible. So suppose there are multiple. This implies that there is i, j ∈ N such that all
agents N\{i} top-rank Ωi, ϕj(E) 6= Ωi, and for each h ∈ N\{i, j}, ϕh(E) = Ωi. Note that
j is assigned his second-ranked object, and each other agent is assigned their top-ranked
object. By deﬁnition of S, ϕj(E
′) = Ωi. If i = 1, then since E ∈ E\Eˆ , 1 does not top-rank
e, implying 1 ∈ S, and ϕi(E)Pi e = ϕi(E ′)a contradiction. If i = 5, then all agents
N\{5} top-rank e in R, and ϕj(E ′) = e. Since j 6= i = 5, and e /∈
⋃
h∈{2,3,4} ϕh(E
′), j = 1.
Then, since 2 top-ranks e in R, but from E ′ ∈ E\Eˆ , 2 top-ranks a in R′, so 2 ∈ S and
ϕ2(E) = e Pi a = ϕ2(E
′)a contradiction. If i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, then all agents N\{i} top-rank
Ωi in R. Since Ωi /∈
⋃
h∈{1,2,3,4} ϕh(E
′), ϕj(E ′) = Ωi implies j = 5. Hence, 1 ∈ S, and
ϕ1(E) = Ωi P1 e = ϕ1(E
′)a contradiction. 
2.4
Let σ ∈ Σ. Let pi be a permutation of N s.t. pi(1) = i, for each k ∈ {2, . . . , σ−1(i)}, pi(k) =
σ(k − 1), and for each k ∈ {σ−1(i) + 1, . . . , n}, pi(k) = σ(k). Let pi′ be a permutation of N
s.t. pi(n) = i, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , σ−1(i)}, pi(k) = σ(k), and for each k ∈ {σ−1(i), . . . , n−1},
pi(k) = σ(k + 1).
For each E = (R,Ω) ∈ E , and each σ ∈ Σ, let
ϕσ(E) ≡
{
TTC − SIpi(E) if Ωi 6= ∅
TTC − SIpi′(E) if Ωi = ∅
Then, ϕσ satisﬁes group strategy-proofness, the reciprocity lower bound, and eﬃciency,
but not withholding-proofness.
2.5
Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ be s.t. σ(2) = σ′(3), σ(3) = σ′(2), and for each i ∈ N\{2, 3}, σ(i) = σ′(i). Let
{A,B} be a partition of O.
For each E ∈ E , let
ϕ(E) ≡
{
TTC − SIσ(E) if TTC − SIσ1 (E) ∈ A
TTC − SIσ′(E) if TTC − SIσ1 (E) ∈ B
.
Then, ϕ satisﬁes group strategy-proofness, withholding-proofness, eﬃciency, and the reci-
procity lower bound, but ϕσ is not in the TTC − SI family of rules.
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